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Definitions
The measure of the change in neutrons from one generation to
the next.
Delayed neutron
A neutron that is released sometime after the fission event
occurs.
Firewall
An intrinsic trait of a material that represents a barrier to
proliferation.
Fission
An event in which a nucleus separates into multiple parts,
releasing energy in the process.
Half-life
The amount of time in which half of the radionuclides in a
sample have decayed.
HEU
Enriched uranium having a concentration of 235U greater than
20%.
Induced fission
Fission event that is caused by an incident neutron.
keff
The ratio of the number of neutrons in one generation to the
number of neutrons in the next.
LEU
Enriched uranium having a higher concentration of 235U than
natural, but less than 20% 235U.
Material attractiveness The attractiveness a particular material has for weapon’s
purposes.
Nuclear nonproliferation The decrease in or spread of nuclear weapons technology or
materials.
Nuclear proliferation
The increase in or spread of nuclear weapons technology or
materials.
Predetonation
The detonation of a nuclear weapon before it has reached its
optimal compression due to the amount of spontaneous fission
neutrons produced by the material.
Proliferation resistance The resistance an object (ex.: material, reactor design, fuel
cycle, etc.) has to be utilized in a nuclear weapons program.
Prompt neutron
A neutron that is released at the moment of the fission event.
Self-explosion
The detonation of high explosives as a result of temperature
increase above its “self-explosion temperature.”
Spontaneous fission
Fission even that occurs suddenly due to the instability of the
nucleus.
Tensile Strength
The amount of tensile stress a material can undergo before
plastic deformation occurs.
xiv

Weaponization
Yield

The process by which a material is converted to a usable form
for a nuclear weapon.
The expected amount of energy released from the detonation
of a nuclear weapon.
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Abstract

Decreasing the material attractiveness of uranium and plutonium materials is crucial to
nuclear nonproliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements
safeguards across the world on a limited budget. Not only does decreasing material
attractiveness reduce the possibility of proliferation, but also may lighten the financial
burden on the IAEA if safeguards can be reduced. Two particular isotopes that have negative
material attractiveness traits are 238Pu and 232U. Without isotopic separation technology,
these isotopes cannot be removed from plutonium and uranium materials respectively. Both
238Pu and 232U produce large quantities of heat by alpha decay. High decay heat is considered
one of the primary impacts on material attractiveness. This decay heat causes major issues
during weaponization and can render the high explosives in a weapon useless and cause
failure in the materials if high enough temperatures are reached. In addition to high alpha
decay heat, 238Pu has a high spontaneous fission neutron generation rate, which can lead to
a reduction in the yield of a nuclear weapon. 232U’s daughter products give a relatively high
dose rate over time. Both the dose rate and heat generation increase over time, reaching a
maximum after 10 years. 232U will also create difficulty during the enrichment process.
Considering 232U is lighter than 235U, its concentration will increase at a higher rate during
enrichment. The decay of 232U in gaseous UF6 can destroy UF6 molecules creating a variety
of lighter molecules that must be separated from the enrichment stream. This study will
evaluate the effects of 238Pu and 232U on material attractiveness. The material attractiveness
of these materials will be quantified using multiple methods in an attempt to make a broad
statement about their attractiveness. In order to better understand the feasibility of the
introduction of 232U into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, the effects on safety, security, and
safeguards will also be explored.

xvi

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation

Limiting the proliferation of nuclear material is crucial for the international use of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The utilization of nuclear energy is spreading

internationally with several countries constructing or considering constructing their first

commercial nuclear reactor, including Bangladesh, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the

United Arab Emirates (1). With the continuous expansion of nuclear energy internationally,
the possible use of nuclear materials for weapons purposes remains a major concern.

Although infrequent, this proliferation of nuclear materials has occurred historically such
as in the case of Iran’s enrichment program (2) or the Democratic People’s Republic of

Korea (DPRK) nuclear weapons program (3).

Increasing the difficulty of proliferation is a complex issue. Proliferation resistance

is a commonly used term to describe the difficulty in proliferating nuclear technology or

material. The term is broad and can be applied to anything from a specific nuclear material

to an entire fuel cycle. Although useful in a qualitative sense, the term lacks the ability to be

applied quantitatively. In order to limit ambiguity and foster a more quantitative analysis, a
material’s specific firewalls against proliferation are considered. These firewalls are

intrinsic features of a material, such as decay heat, that make the material less attractive for
weapons purposes. This falls within the scope of proliferation resistance and is narrow
enough to analyze a particular nuclear material.

This increase in use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes requires an increase in

the international safeguards that ensure the material is not used for weapons purposes.
1

Implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), international safeguards
must cover nuclear fuel cycles across the world with limited resources. The use of these
limited resources must be as efficient as possible, as to effectively safeguard nuclear

material and deter proliferation. Decreasing a material’s attractiveness may lead to a

reduction in safeguards, allowing for resources to be reallocated to more essential tasks.
Not only is this financially beneficial for the IAEA, but also decreasing material

attractiveness creates significant obstacles with which a proliferant state must deal with in
order to weaponize the material. These obstacles can limit a state’s ability to proliferate
both financially and technologically. Even in a breakout scenario in which a state has
broken its safeguards agreement and decided to proliferate, decreased material
attractiveness will slow the state’s proliferation.
1.2. Objectives

The primary objective of this study is to understand the impact of elevated 238Pu

concentration in plutonium materials and 232U concentration in uranium materials on
material attractiveness. The impacts on critical mass, decay heat, spontaneous fission

neutron generation rate, and dose rate from the addition of each isotope will be quantified
and discussed within the scope of weapons usability. Considering 232U does not occur

naturally, additional impacts beyond those directly contributing to material attractiveness
must be considered. In order for 232U to be a realistic option for decreasing material

attractiveness of uranium materials, the following issues must be explored. The effects on
the gaseous centrifuge enrichment process from the addition of 232U is evaluated. Also,

possible issues with safeguards measurements of uranium materials containing 232U is

considered. From a safety perspective, the dose rate from these proposed uranium
2

materials is calculated and compared to safety standards. The detectability of these

uranium materials is also simulated. Since 238Pu is found in plutonium from used nuclear
fuel, these additional issues need not be considered.
1.3. Background

1.3.1. Introduction to Nuclear Nonproliferation
1.3.1.1. Basics of Nuclear Proliferation

In order to understand nuclear nonproliferation, one must also understand nuclear

proliferation. Nuclear proliferation is the increase in or spread of nuclear weapons

technology or materials. The possession of nuclear weapons represents a certain amount of
power and prestige for a state entity. Nuclear weapons are one of the most powerful

weapons ever conceived and are capable of producing destruction on large scales. In 1945,
the United States detonated the only two nuclear weapons ever used in warfare on the

Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The weapons had a yield equivalent to 21 and
15 kilotons of TNT (4). Although the exact estimates for those killed and wounded vary

from source to source, an estimated 66,000 died in Hiroshima and 39,000 in Nagasaki. An
estimated 69,000 were injured in Hiroshima and 25,000 in Nagasaki. These numbers are
staggering considering the death toll for each was approximately one fourth of the cities’
total populations, 255,000 and 195,000 (5).

The science behind nuclear energy is as follows. Although both the peaceful and

weapons use of nuclear energy utilize the fission of fissile isotopes, the manner in which
fission is utilized is slightly different. A fission event can be induced or spontaneous. An

induced fission event occurs when the nucleus absorbs a neutron and splits. A spontaneous
fission event occurs spontaneously without the need for neutron absorption. Induced
3

fission is far more probable in 235U. However, 239Pu has a notable probability of fissioning

both spontaneously and induced. When a fission event occurs, fission fragments, neutrons,
and gamma rays are released. Some of the neutrons released are released promptly at the
moment of fission. These neutrons are called prompt neutrons. However, some neutrons

are released slightly after. These neutrons are called delayed neutrons. The neutrons from

one fission event may induce another fission which will release neutrons. The repetition of
this process makes up a fission chain reaction. In a nuclear reactor, chain reactions are

intended to be sustained by delayed neutrons. This allows for control by way of insertion

or removal of control rods. A chain reaction made up of prompt neutrons within a reactor

would be uncontrollable by human intervention. In a nuclear weapon, the chain reaction is
intended to comprise solely of prompt neutrons. This allows for a rapid increase in power

as the weapon is detonated. keff is important in understanding how the chain reactions will

progress. keff is the ratio of the number of neutrons in a generation to the number of

neutrons in the previous generation. If keff is less than one, the fissile material is subcritical
and the chain reaction will eventually end as the number of neutrons are decreasing from

one generation to the next. If keff is equal to one, the fissile material is critical and the chain
reaction will continue with each generation having the same number of neutrons. If keff is
greater than one, the chain reaction will continue with each generation of neutrons

increasing in number (6). Fission type nuclear weapons are designed such that they’re

initially subcritical and will become super critical as the fissile material is compressed.
1.3.1.2. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

Nuclear nonproliferation is the decrease in or spread of nuclear weapons

technology or materials. This field encompasses efforts around the world that seek to
4

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT) was formed as a global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The treaty was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty
creates two classifications of states: Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear

Weapons States (NNWS). The five NWS; the United States of America, the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, and China, were classified as such due to the fact that each state possessed
nuclear weapons at the time of the NPT’s creation. The remaining signatories of the NPT
and presumably all future signatories are classified as NNWS. These NNWS agree to not

pursue nuclear weapons, including both receiving nuclear weapons from other states and
manufacturing them, in exchange for the ability to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes. In order to ensure each NNWS adheres to this agreement, the NPT requires

NNWS to agree to a nuclear safeguards agreement that is negotiated and monitored by the
IAEA (7).

Each safeguards agreement will be negotiated directly between the IAEA and the

member state in accordance with the Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153). This

document discusses the objectives of the safeguards agreement and lays the framework for

the agreement (8). Including the 5 NWS, 191 states have signed the NPT (9). Thus, the IAEA
is responsible for imposing safeguards on over 100 states across the world. This immense
responsibility, coupled with the limited budget of the IAEA, makes implementing

safeguards in the most efficient manner possible crucial. According to the IAEA Department
of Safeguards Long-Term Strategic Plan for 2012-2023, the IAEA desires to implement

“smarter” safeguards to reduce the overall burden of safeguards to where they’re the most
5

needed (10). This is the major motivation for developing nuclear materials resistant to
proliferation.

1.3.1.3. Direct Use Nuclear Materials
Proliferation resistance is especially of concern when considering direct use nuclear

material. These materials contain fissile isotopes and have significant attractiveness for
weapons purposes (11). The two most common of these materials are plutonium and

highly enriched uranium (HEU). 233U is also classified as a direct use nuclear material but is

far less common in most nuclear fuel cycles across the world. However, with the significant
research in thorium fuel cycles, 233U may become more pertinent in the proliferation
resistant conversation.

Plutonium is created through the burnup of uranium and is thus present in all used

nuclear fuel. Although 239Pu is the most attractive isotope of plutonium for weapons

purposes, all plutonium is considered weapons usable. The only international safeguards

exemption by the IAEA on plutonium is plutonium containing over 80% 238Pu (11). This is
primarily due to the high alpha decay heat of 238Pu. This limit is well above the typical

concentration of 238Pu found in used nuclear fuel and doesn’t exclude any plutonium found

in used nuclear fuel.

HEU is uranium with a 235U concentration ≥20% (11). HEU is obtained through the

enrichment of natural uranium (0.711 wt. % 235U). This material is not as fissile as

plutonium, but is still a significant threat for weaponization. Although HEU is considered
direct use nuclear material, an additional classification for uranium, weapons grade, is

especially important when considering weaponization. Weapons grade uranium is uranium
having approximately >90 wt. % 235U.

6

1.3.2. Contributions to Material Attractiveness

Material attractiveness is constantly debated within the nuclear nonproliferation

community. In simplistic terms, a material’s attractiveness is a measure of how attractive

that material is for weapons purposes. Several physical characteristics of a nuclear material
contribute to the material’s attractiveness.

This debate is often centered on plutonium. Although the proliferation of uranium is

possible, a plutonium weapon requires less mass and plutonium can be found in all used

nuclear fuel. The three main properties of plutonium that is of proliferation concern are the
bare critical mass, spontaneous fission neutron rate, and heat generation (12). The bare

critical mass is important as it is related to the amount of mass required to weaponized the
material. The spontaneous fission neutron rate is important as it impacts the functionality
of the weapon. As the implosion occurs, a higher neutron emission rate in the fissile

material can stop the implosion before the optimal implosion has occurred thus reducing
the yield of the weapon (13). The heat generation within a weapon can cause problems
within the high explosives and other materials. An additional property that should be
considered is the radiation dose from a material.

The radiation dose from the materials can have a negative impact on the high

explosives within a weapon as well as anyone responsible for handling the material. In

order to understand the effects of radiation dose, a brief summary of radiation dose units is
needed. There are two main types of radiation doses typically discussed; absorbed dose

and dose equivalent. Absorbed dose quantifies the amount of radiation absorbed within the
matter. The units used for this type of dose are gray (Gy) and rad. One Gy is equivalent to

100 rad. In terms of energy deposition, one gray is equivalent to one J/kg. Dose equivalent
7

incorporates the biological effects of each radiation type through weighting factors. The

units used for this type of dose are Sievery (Sy) and rem. One Sv is equivalent to 100 rem
(6). For the sake of simplicity, this study will focus on absorbed dose.

The explosives within a nuclear weapon will begin to degrade once a high enough

dose has been given. This degradation will reduce the effectiveness of the high explosives
by reducing the detonation velocity (14). This reduction in the explosive potential of the

high explosives will lead to a reduced yield in the weapon.

The effect of the dose rate on humans can be best understood in terms of whole

body dose. The whole body dose is the dose to the entire body without considering a

specific section of the body. When the dose rate is relatively high, lethal acute syndromes
can be considered. Three of these syndromes to be used in this study are central nervous

system (CNS) syndrome, gastrointestinal (GI) syndrome, and Haemopoietic syndrome. CNS
syndrome progresses from drowsiness to lethargy. After several hours, seizures begin and
eventually loss of control of bodily movements occur. Death occurs within 2-3 days. GI

syndrome consists of severe vomiting and diarrhea. This leads to serious dehydration. GI

syndrome typically leads to death within 2-3 weeks. Haemopoietic syndrome is the slowest
progress of the three. Initially slight nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur within the
first 6-12 hours after exposure. However, these symptoms may subside for up to three

weeks. The patient may feel healthy until headache, fever, and fatigue begin. This worsens

until the condition proves lethal after 1-2 months (15). Table 1.1 shows the minimum dose
thresholds for the three acute radiation syndromes.
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Table 1.1: Minimum Dose for Acute Radiation Syndromes (15) * (16)
Minimum Dose
Required [Gy]
50
5
0.7*

Syndrome
CNS
GI
Haemopoietic

A more general method to determine the lethality of a dose is to consider the mean

lethal dose. The lethal dose required for death in 50% of exposed individuals is

represented as the LD50. Various time intervals can be related to this dose such as 15, 30,
and 60 days. This will utilize the 60-day time interval. This is represented as the LD50/60.

According to the Center for Disease Control, the LD50/60 is approximately 2.5 to 5 Gy (16).
In addition to the LD 50/60 other dose thresholds can be considered. The radiation

safety standards in the United States are set by the United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC). For simplicity, the doses considered in this study are total effective

dose equivalent. The NRC’s annual limit for the occupational dose of an adult is 5 rem (17).

An additional safety limit is the “self-protecting” dose rate of 500 rad/h at 1 meter (18).

This dose rate limit represents a threshold above which the material is considered

practically unusable for any purpose. This limit is often referred to in terms of material

attractiveness for weapon’s purposes, rather than within the scope of the material’s use in
a civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

1.4. 238Pu Unattractive Features

Elevating the concentration of 238Pu will decrease the material attractiveness of the

plutonium material. This strategy takes advantage of the high alpha decay heat if 238Pu.
Elevated decay heat introduces significant difficulties in handling and weaponizing the
9

material (19). Increased temperature within a hypothetical nuclear explosive device

(HNED) can cause the high explosives to self-explode once a particular temperature is

reached (20). As shown in Table 1.2, 238Pu has a high decay heat per unit mass than the

other plutonium isotopes. These values have been calculated using data from the Korean
Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) (21).

Table 1.2: Decay Heat Contributions of Pu Isotopes [W/kg]
Isotope
α
238Pu
557.43
239Pu
1.88
240Pu
6.94
241Pu
242Pu
0.11

β
3.22
-

In addition to the high alpha decay heat of 238Pu, the spontaneous fission neutron

generation rate is unattractive for weapons purposes. A high spontaneous fission neutron
generation rate within an HNED can cause the HNED to detonate prematurely before

maximum compression is achieved resulting in a lower yield (22). As shown in Table 1.3,
the even numbered plutonium isotopes have higher spontaneous fission neutron

generation rates with 238Pu having the highest. Although not often mentioned when
discussing plutonium, the dose rate from the elevated 238Pu concentration may also

contribute to its material attractiveness. This has not been thoroughly investigated and

could play an important role in decreasing the material attractiveness of plutonium in used
fuel.
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Table 1.3: Spontaneous Fission Neutron Generation Rate of Pu Isotopes [n/s/g] (23)
Isotope

238Pu
239Pu
240Pu
241Pu
242Pu

n/s/g
2.59·103
2.18·10-2
1.02·103
5.00·10-2
1.72·103

1.5. Possible Production Routes for 238Pu

Higher 238Pu concentration in used nuclear fuel can be achieved using a few

methods. The most common is burning fuel with a higher concentration of 235U than

typically in reactor grade uranium at a high burnup. Figure 1.1 shows the production route
of 238Pu via 235U.

Figure 1.1: 238Pu Production by way of 235U
In addition to 235U, 237Np and 241Am can also be used (24). These isotopes can be

mixed with fresh fuel and burned in a reactor to produce higher concentrations of 238Pu in

used nuclear fuel. Figure 1 shows the production route using 237Np. Figure 1.2 shows the
production route using 241Am.
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Figure 1.2:

238Pu

Production by way of 241Am

1.6. 232U Unattractive Features

Mixing 232U with naturally occurring uranium isotopes can decrease the material

attractiveness. The unattractive features of 232U are two-fold. The initial alpha decay of 232U

is relatively high and over time the dose rate and decay heat of the material increases (25).

This increase in dose rate over time is due to the build-up of 208Tl, which emits an energetic
gamma ray with energy of 2.615 MeV. Not only is the dose rate a danger to anyone who

may handle the material, but also can damage the high explosives of a weapon. Over time,
energy deposition by gamma radiation within the high explosives may cause them to

degrade leading to reduced effectiveness (14). Table 4 shows the decay heat contributions

and half-lives of the uranium isotopes (21). The decay heat of 232U is notable in comparison

to the naturally occurring uranium isotopes. Also, worth noting is the half-life of 232U, which
is several orders of magnitude shorter than that of the naturally occurring uranium
isotopes.
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Table 1.4: Decay Heat Contribution and Half-lives of U Isotopes
Isotope
232U
234U
235U
238U

α-Decay Heat
[W/kg]
703
0.176
5.63·10-5
8.35·10-6

Half-life
[years]
68.9
2.45·105
7.04·108
4.47·109

In order to understand how the decay heat and dose rate change over time, the

decay chain of 232U must be considered. As shown in Figure 1.3, the daughter products of
232U

have relatively short half-lives and 208Tl builds up rapidly. The decay chain progresses

rapidly upon the decay of 228Th.

Figure 1.3: 232U Decay Chain
Table 1.5 shows the decay heat per unit mass of 232U’s daughter products. Although

the daughter products are present in fractional amounts, they produce high enough decay
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heat to greatly increase the total decay heat of the material over time. Both the decay heat
and dose rate reach a maximum after approximately 10 years (25).

Table 1.5: 232U Daughter Products Decay Heat
Isotope

W/kg

228Th

2.63·104

224Ra

5.36·106

220Rn

3.44·1010

212Bi

2.32·108

216Po

212Pb
208Tl

212Po

1.45·1013
8.25·105
9.82·108

9.27·1018

In addition to the decay heat and dose rate, 232U poses a significant obstacle for the

enrichment process (26). Without utilizing isotopic separation technology, 232U cannot be

separated from the uranium material. The main purpose of the enrichment of natural

uranium is to increase the concentration of 235U and decrease the concentration of 238U

making the material more fissile. Although the concentration of 234U is also increased, the

initial concentration of 234U is so low that it is not an impact. However, the significant mass

difference between 232U and 235U (three neutrons) would cause the concentration of 232U to

greatly increase during the enrichment process. This would increase the effects of heat
generation and dose rate as the material is enriched. The emission of alpha particles in
gaseous UF6 poses an additional threat to the enrichment process (26). When UF6

molecules are irradiated with alpha particles, the molecules may decompose through the

creation of ion pairs. Historically, this issue was considered through the scope of the effects
of 234U’s alpha decay in gaseous UF6 (27). 232U’s effects will be significantly more notable as
14

its alpha emission rate is higher than that of 234U. Table 1.6 shows the alpha emission rates
of 232U and the naturally occurring uranium isotopes.

Table 1.6: Alpha Emission Rate of U Isotopes
Alpha
Emission
Rate
Isotope
[α/s/g]
232U
8.28·1011
234U
2.31·108
235U
8.00·104
238U
1.24·104

Although not typically mentioned when referencing uranium, the spontaneous

fission neutron rate of 232U may increase the detectability of uranium materials containing
232U.

Neutrons are often more difficult to shield than gamma rays and may allow for the

detection of these materials in situations where gamma ray measurements may not. Table
1.7 shows the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of 232U and the naturally

occurring uranium isotopes. Although these values are smaller than that of the even

numbered plutonium isotopes, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of 232U is

notable as it would allow for increased detection ability.

Table 1.7: Spontaneous Fission Neutron Generation Rate of U Isotopes (23)

Isotope
232U
234U
235U
238U

Spontaneous
Fission
Neutron Rate
[n/(s⋅kg)]
1300
5.02
0.299
13.6
15

In addition to spontaneous fission neutrons, uranium materials that include 232U in

an oxide matrix (such as UO2) will release a higher number of (α,n) neutrons. (α,n)

neutrons are produced when an alpha particle reacts with an atom (such as oxygen) and
releases a neutron. Table 1.8 shows the (α,n) neutron generation rate of 232U and the

naturally occurring uranium isotopes. Considering 232U’s high alpha particle emission rate,
its presence in UO2 creates orders of magnitude more (α,n) neutrons than naturally
occurring uranium isotopes.

Table 1.8: (α,n) Neutron Generation Rate of U Isotopes (23)
(α,n) Neutron
Rate [n/(s⋅kg)]
1.49·107
3.00·103
7.10·10-1
8.30·10-2

Isotope
232U
234U
235U
238U

1.7. Possible Production Routes for 232U

Although this study will not focus specifically on producing 232U, proposing and

highlighting possible production routes is essential to understanding the feasibility of the
proposed use of 232U. Historically, 232U has been discussed as it relates to thorium fuel

cycles. When natural thorium, containing mostly 232Th, is irradiated by neutrons, 233U is

produced containing fractional amounts of 232U. 232Th absorbs a neutron producing 233Th,

which then beta decays to 233Pa. 233Pa then beta decays to 233U, an isotope whose fissile

capabilities are more like plutonium than 235U. An (n,2n) reaction with 233Th, 233Pa, or 233U,
will lead to the production of 232U (28). This production route is not useful for the method
proposed in this study. Only fractional amounts of 232U are produced with most of the

uranium produced being 233U. These isotopes would be difficult to separate as doing so
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would require isotopic separation technology. The production route needed here should
produce mainly 232U.
231Pa

Producing 232U specifically can be done by utilizing 230Th and 231Pa (29). 230Th and

are both found in nature in fractional amounts. Figure 1.4 show the production route

for 232U.

Figure 1.4: Production Route for 232U
1.8. Material Properties

This section will discuss the material properties of both plutonium and uranium.

1.8.1. Plutonium Material Properties

This study will analyze plutonium in metallic form as this is the most attractive for

weapons purposes. Plutonium has a several solid phases with various densities. Figure 1.5
shows the solid phases of plutonium as a function of density and temperature.
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Figure 1.5: Plutonium phases (30)
The delta phase is most attractive for weapons purposes (20), but is not stable at

room temperature. In order to stabilize delta phase plutonium at room temperature and

across a wide range of temperatures, a small percentage (5 at.%) of gallium can be added.
Figure 1.6 shows the plutonium-gallium phase diagram (31).

Figure 1.6: Plutonium-Gallium Phase Diagram (31)
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The crystal structure of delta phase plutonium is a face-centered cubic. Delta phase

plutonium has a density of 15.8 g/cm3. Table 1.9 shows the thermophysical properties of
plutonium used in this study.

Table 1.9: Thermophysical Properties of Plutonium (30) (31)

Thermal
Conductivity
[W/m·K]
10.97

Heat
Capacity
[J/g·K]
0.13

Modulus of
Elasticity
[GPa]
68

Thermal
Expansion
[1/K]
3.00·10-6

Tensile
Strength
[GPa]

1.00·10-1

1.8.2. Uranium Material Properties

Uranium will be considered in several material form; metallic, UO2 powder, and

sintered UO2. The metallic form is considerably less complicated than in the case of

plutonium. Metallic uranium has three solid phases; α, β, and γ. α phase is stable under 669
°C so this is the phase considered here. α phase uranium has an orthorhombic crystal

structure with a density of 19.05 g/cm3.

Table 1.10: Thermophysical Properties of Uranium (30)

Thermal
Conductivity
[W/(m·K)]
28.9

Heat
Capacity
[J/(g·K)]
0.1163

Modulus of
Elasticity
[GPa]
190

Thermal
Expansion
[1/K]
1.39·10-5

Tensile
Strength
[GPa]
0.615

UO2 is not attractive for weapons purposes but is found in nuclear fuel cycles as fuel.

Initially, UO2 may be stored as a powder and later sintered. Powder UO2 has an

approximate density of 2.5 g/cm3. Sintered UO2 has a density of 10.96 g/cm3 (30). The

thermophysical properties previously described are not needed for the analysis of UO2

done here.
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1.8.3. Additional Material Properties

In addition to the thermophysical properties of the fissile material, that of the other

materials found in the HNED is also needed. The high explosives chosen to analyze is PBX
9502. PBX 9502 is a polymer bonded explosive that has a self-explosion temperature of

331 °C, starts pyrolysis at 395 °C, and melts at 448 °C. Table 1.11 shows the densities for
the HNED materials.

Table 1.11: HNED Material Densities ** (20)
Material

Be
PBX 9502
Al casing

Density
(30)
[g/cm3]
1.85
1.90**
2.7

References
(30)
(20)
(30)

Table 1.12 shows the thermophysical properties of the additional HNED materials.

Table 1.12: Thermophysical Properties of HNED Materials (30), (32), (33), (34), (35), (36)
Material

Be
PBX
9502
Al casing

Thermal
Conductivity
[W/m·K]
102

Heat
Capacity
[J/g·K]
1.78

Modulus of
Elasticity
[GPa]
303

Thermal
Expansion
[1/K]
1.60·10-5

98ᶧ

1.177
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2.30·10-5

0.5607

1.125

15.3

4.01·10-6

Tensile
Strength [GPa]
1.90·10-1
3.23·10-3
4.80·10-1

The properties affecting the radiation and convective heat transfer at the surface of

the models must be considered. The radiation heat transfer will be assumed to be that of a
black body as this produces the best case for the heat transfer and is a limiting case. Table
1.13 shows the convective heat transfer coefficients for air and liquid nitrogen.
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Table 1.13: Convective Heat Transfer Coefficients [W/cm2·K] (37) (38)
Convective Heat
Transfer
Coefficient
0.001
0.01

Fluid

Air
Liquid Nitrogen
1.9. Layout of Dissertation

This dissertation is made up of five chapters. The second chapter describes the

previous studies that serve as the basis and background for this dissertation. These studies
span several techniques for evaluating the attractiveness of both plutonium and uranium

materials for weapons purposes. The third chapter describes the methodology used in this
study. This methodology consists of a model based approach and figure of merit approach
for both plutonium and uranium materials. In addition, an analysis to evaluate the

practicality of the implementation of the uranium material in the civilian world. The fourth
chapter reports and discusses the results from the methods described in Chapter 3. The

fifth chapter concludes the dissertation. This chapter not only summarizes and concludes
the plutonium and uranium analyses, but also elaborates on the scope of the final
conclusions and describes possible future works.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Quantifying proliferation resistance is a complex task. In particular, when

referencing the proliferation resistance of a specific material, making an accurate

assessment can be open to interpretation. Historically, proliferation resistance assessments
have varied greatly. This section will discuss three specific analyses used to assess
proliferation resistance of nuclear materials.
2.1. Modeling Based Analysis

This section shall describe the use of a specific model in order to assess the material

attractiveness and proliferation resistance of the fissile material. These studies investigated
plutonium vectors with elevated 238Pu content. Two similar studies are worth discussing to
illustrate their methodology and possible shortfalls.

Dr. Kessler of the Technical University of Karlsruhe in Germany has published his

work in regards to denaturing plutonium using 238Pu. Kessler analyzed 8 plutonium vectors
having 238Pu concentrations ranging from 1.6% to 24.5%. He created three simple

hypothetical spherical fission type nuclear weapon models representing high, medium, and
low technology. Each model had varying thicknesses of high explosives and reflectors, with
the high technology having the thinnest and the low technology having the thickest. Figure
2.1 shows the three simplistic models. Each model is spherically symmetric.
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Figure 2.1: Kessler's Models (20)
The plutonium masses for each vector were chosen in order to give the model a keff

of 0.98. Using steady state heat transfer through the model, the temperature throughout

each layer was determined. The temperature within the high explosives were compared to
the “self-explosion” temperature of the high explosives to determine if the weapon would

self-explode. Kessler concluded that plutonium vectors containing approximately 6% 238Pu
or more would result in the self-explosion temperature being reached even in the high
technology case (20).

Using the models shown in Figure 2.1, a group from the Research Laboratory from

Nuclear Reactors at the Tokyo Institute of Technology analyzed the temperature within the
high explosives as a function of 238Pu concentration. Rather than analyze a few specific

plutonium vectors, they sought to relate the maximum temperature in the high explosives
to the concentration of 238Pu. Their final conclusion was that 238Pu above 15% would be

infeasible in the high technology case, above 6% in the medium technology case, and above
2% in the low technology case (19). The 15% is a significantly higher concentration of
238Pu

than that the 6% proposed by Kessler.
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Although these studies were able to make conclusions regarding how the 238Pu

concentration impacts the three models, the scope of these studies are narrow and only
draw conclusions in regards to those specific models. These studies fail to make a more

broad assessment of material attractiveness. The plutonium vectors analyzed by Kessler
aren’t necessarily realistic. These vectors were obtained at high burnups that do not

represent what is currently standard in the nuclear fuel cycle. Another major issue is that

the results are heavily dependent on the models. Any deviation in the models (ex. changes
in the high explosives type or thickness) will change the results. Also, these models do not

represent a limiting case. A keff of 0.98 is close to critical (keff=1) and the weapon essentially
has nearly a maximal plutonium mass without being critical. A nearly maximal plutonium

mass would then produce a nearly maximal heat generation. In order for the model to be a
limiting case, the keff must be minimal in order to minimize the mass and heat generation
while still being a functional HNED.
2.2. Figure of Merit Analysis

In order to broaden the assessment of material attractiveness, a Figure of Merit

(FOM) analysis is useful. A group led by Charles Bathke at Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory developed a FOM that serves as a metric for attractiveness (18). An important
note of this study is its definition of proliferation resistance. Proliferation resistance is

defined as the characteristics of a material to impeded diversion of nuclear material by a

state. This definition excluded any non-state entities such as terrorist organization. Non-

state entities are not considered in the analysis. The state entities considered in this study
are separated into two categories: technically advanced states and less technically
advanced states.
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This analysis uses physical characteristics of a material as inputs and output a FOM

value that measures the material’s attractiveness. These physical characteristics are the

bare critical mass, the heat generation, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate,

and the dose rate. These are seen as the four main properties of a material that determine

its attractiveness for weapons purposes. Each characteristic is represented by a factor that
is normalized to accepted standards. The bare critical mass factor is normalized to the

threshold for low enriched uranium (<20% 235U). The heat generation factor is normalized

to the international safeguards limit for 238Pu concentration (80% 238Pu). The spontaneous

fission neutron generation rate factor is normalized to reactor grade plutonium (≥20%
240Pu).

The dose rate factor is normalized to a “self-protecting” dose rate of 500 rad/h at 1

meter. For technically advanced states, the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate

factor is excluded as a technically advanced state can handle a high neutron generation rate
within a weapon and avoid pre-detonation. All four factors are included in the case of less
technically advanced states. Equation 2.1 shows the FOM for less technically advanced

states (FOM1). Equation 2.2 shows the FOM for technically advanced states (FOM2). In these

equations the FOM is related to the bare critical mass in units of kg (M), the heat generation
in units of W/kg (h), the spontaneous fission neutron rate in units of neutrons/s/kg (S),
and the dose rate in units of rad/h (D).
Equation 2.1

1

𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀ℎ
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷 log10 2
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀1 = 1 − log10 �
+
+
+
�
�
�
800 4500 6.8(10)6 50 500
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Equation 2.2
1

𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀ℎ
𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷 log10 2
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀2 = 1 − log10 �
+
+ �
�
�
800 4500 50 500

The FOM is separated into ranges that relate the value to the material’s weapons

utility and attractiveness. Table 2.1 shows these ranges.

Table 2.1: FOM Ranges and Material Attractiveness
FOM

Weapons
Utility

Attractiveness

>2
1-2
0-1
<0

Preferred
Attractive
Unattractive
Unattractive

High
Medium
Low
Very Low

Bathke applies this FOM to a variety of materials to quantify their attractiveness

(18). The FOM analysis makes a broader statement about material attractiveness than the
model based analysis as it doesn’t apply to a specific situation but rather the material in
any situation. However, this analysis is only useful for direct use material in a weapon’s

usable form (i.e. metal). Any potential process such as conversion from one chemical form
to another or enrichment is excluded from this analysis. For example, if considering a

uranium vector, the FOM would result in unattractive if the 235U enrichment were below
20%. However, if the same material were enriched, the FOM would change. The

infrastructure required to convert an unattractive material to an attractive one is not

possessed by every state and should be accounted for. Also, how the material might affect
these processes is important when determining the material’s attractiveness.
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2.3. Broader Approaches

In the case of 232U proliferation resistance analyses, studies have been broad and

somewhat ambiguous. Considering 232U is currently found in thorium fuel cycles, previous
studies were done on 232U/233U mixtures. As natural thorium is irradiated with neutrons,
233U

is created with fractional amount of 232U as a result of (n,2n) reactions.

A study done at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by Dr. Moir attempted to

analyze the proliferation resistant features of 232U/233U mixtures. The study shows the

major increase in heat generation and dose rate over time from the daughter products of
232U.

Both reaching a maximum after approximately 10 years. This study also introduces

the impact of radiation damage to high explosives. A high explosive can withstand 100 MR,
equivalent to 0.877 Mrads and 0.00877 MGy, before degrading (14). However, the study
only evaluates the dose rate from 1 meter rather than analyzing the dose given to high

explosive within a realistic model. Without a realistic model, the study ignores the photon
attenuation that would occur within the layers of the model.

Another study evaluates denaturing 20% 235U uranium materials with 232U (26).

This study mentions the increase in dose rate, but focuses mostly on the increase in the
neutron yield. The neutron yield is significantly larger than that of a uranium material

containing natural uranium isotopes and would allow for detection via neutron detectors.
This study also mentions the effect of alpha decay within gaseous UF6. UF6 molecules are

destroyed by the irradiation of alpha particles. The study concludes that 48% of UF6

molecules are destroyed in one tenth of a year. However, the analysis is difficult to follow

and not rigorous. A considerable percentage of UF6 molecules being destroyed would pose
a serious barrier to uranium enrichment. Since the separation of isotopes are driven by
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mass differences, the lighter molecules created from the destruction of UF6 molecules
would be counterproductive to the enrichment process.
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3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Heat Transfer Theory

This study analyzes conductive heat transfer throughout multiple shells of several

spherically symmetric HNED models in

order to calculate the temperature profiles

throughout each shell. Equation 3.1 shows the complete conductive heat transfer equation
in spherical coordinates (37). In this equation, the temperature in units of K (T) is related
to the radius in units of m (r), time in units of s (t), the angle with respect to the x-axis in

units of radian (θ), the angle with respect to the z-axis in units of radian (ф), the thermal

conductivity in units of W/(m·K) (k), the density in units of kg/m3 (ρ), the heat capacity in
units of J/K (Cp), and the heat generation in units of W (ġ ).
Equation 3.1

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
1
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
1
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
1 𝜕𝜕
2
�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟
�
+
�𝑘𝑘
�
+
�𝑘𝑘
sin
𝜃𝜃
�
+
𝑔𝑔̇
=
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶
𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 2 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑟𝑟 2 sin2 𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑟𝑟 2 sin 𝜃𝜃 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

Considering all of the models considered here are spherically symmetric, all partial

derivatives with respect to θ and ф are equal to 0. The simplified version of the heat
equation is shown in Equation 3.2.
Equation 3.2

1 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
2
�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟
�
+
𝑔𝑔̇
=
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶
𝑝𝑝
𝑟𝑟 2 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

3.1.1. Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer
3.3.

In the steady state case (no time dependence), Equation 3.2 is simplified to Equation

Equation 3.3
1 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
2
�𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟
� + 𝑔𝑔̇ = 0
𝑟𝑟 2 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
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Equation 3.3 is solved analytically for two cases; with heat generation (ġ ≠0) and

without heat generation (ġ =0). Equation 3.4 shows the temperature profile within a shell
that is generating heat. This equation relates the temperature (T) with the outer

temperature (To), the inner radius (ri), the outer radius (ro), the heat generation (ġ ), the
thermal conductivity (k), and the radius (r).
Equation 3.4

𝑔𝑔̇ 𝑟𝑟 2 𝑔𝑔̇ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖3 𝑔𝑔̇ 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜2 𝑔𝑔̇ 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖3
−
+
+
+ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜
𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟) = −
6𝑘𝑘 3𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 6𝑘𝑘 3𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜

Equation 3.5 shows the temperature profile with a shell that is not generating heat.

Equation 3.5

𝑇𝑇(𝑟𝑟) =

𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 ) 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 )
−
+ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜
𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 )
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖

3.1.2. Transient Conductive Heat Transfer

Considering the complexity in attempting to solve Equation 3.2 analytically,

discretizing the equation is a simpler way to analyze the transient conductive heat transfer.
In to discretize, the partial derivate with respect to the radius must be expanded. Equation
3.6 shows the expanded equation.
Equation 3.6

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑇𝑇
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
2𝑘𝑘 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
+ 𝑘𝑘 2 + 𝑔𝑔̇ = 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑟𝑟 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

Each term is discretized using a forward finite difference discretization (39).

Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 show the forward finite difference discretization of the first
derivative with respect to r and t. Equation 3.9 shows the central forward difference

discretization of the second derivative with respect to r. i corresponds to the ith node. j
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corresponds to the jth node. Δr is the step size in the radial direction. Δt is the step size in
time.

Equation 3.7
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗+1

𝑗𝑗

Equation 3.8

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
=
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
Δ𝑟𝑟

Equation 3.9

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
− 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖
=
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
Δ𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝑗𝑗

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 − 2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1
=
Δ𝑟𝑟 2
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟 2

Equation 3.10 shows Equation 3.6 with Equation 3.7, Equation 3.8, and Equation 3.9

substituted for each of the derivative terms. This equation is solved for the temperature at
the j+1 time step. Matlab will be used to model this equation.

Equation 3.10

𝑗𝑗+1

𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖

=

kΔ𝑡𝑡 2 𝑗𝑗
1
𝑔𝑔̇ Δ𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
� �𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 � + �𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 − 2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1 �� + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 Δ𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟
Δ𝑟𝑟
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝

Equation 3.11 shows the only stability criteria for Equation 3.10.

Equation 3.11

3.1.3. Boundary Conditions

𝑘𝑘Δ𝑡𝑡
1
<
𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝 Δ𝑟𝑟 2 2

In order to analyze the heat transfer throughout the entire models, the boundary

conditions must be used. The first boundary condition is the thermal energy transferred at
each boundary is the same, because only the inner most shell is generating heat. At the

outermost layer, the thermal energy is transferred via natural convection and radiation.
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Equation 3.12 shows the relationship between the thermal energy in units of W (Q� ) and the
surface temperature in units of K (Ts), the temperature of the surroundings in units of K

(Tsurr), the temperature of the surrounding wall in units of K (T∞), the surface area in units
of m2 (A), the convective heat transfer coefficient in units of W/(m2·K) (h), the radiative

heat transfer coefficient (ε), and the Stefan-Boltzmann constant in units of W/(m2·K4) (σ).

Equation 3.12

4 )
+ ℎ𝐴𝐴(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 − 𝑇𝑇∞ )
𝑄𝑄̇ = 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝐴𝐴(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4 − 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

In addition to the first boundary condition, the temperature throughout the model is

assumed continuous. Although in reality slight air gaps between the shells may be present,
these air gaps would raise the temperature in the outer shells. Therefor assuming perfect
heat conduction between each shell is the best case for heat transfer and would yield the
lowest temperature profile. This serves as the limiting case for this analysis. Since the

models are spherically symmetric, the shells are treated as parts of a thermal resistance

circuit. Equation 3.13 shows the expression of the thermal energy. Since the temperature

profile is continuous, the outer temperature of a shell is equal to the inner temperature of
the next shell.
Equation 3.13

𝑄𝑄̇ =

4𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑘𝑘(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 )
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 − 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖

When considering time dependence, the boundary conditions are the same.

However, the shells are not treated as parts of a thermal circuit, but rather Fourier’s law is
used as an additional boundary condition. Equation 3.14 shows the convective and
radiation boundary condition at the outermost boundary of the model.
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Equation 3.14
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
4 )
= 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠4 − 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
+ ℎ(𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 − 𝑇𝑇∞ )
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿

Equation 3.15 shows Fourier’s law at the interface. In this equation, km is the

thermal conductivity of the mth shell, kn is the thermal conductivity of the nth shell, Tm is the
temperature profile within the mth shell, Tn is the temperature profile within the nth shell,
and rint is the radius at the interface.
Equation 3.15

3.1.4. Thermal Stress

𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚

𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚
𝛿𝛿𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛
= 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Considering the temperature increases, thermal stresses will be experienced in the

shells due to thermal expansion. As the temperature increases in the shells, they will

expand. Since the shells are fixed and won’t be allowed to expand, the shells will experience
thermal stress. Equation 3.16 shows thermal stress (σT), Young’s Modulus of Elasticity (E),
the temperature difference (ΔT), and the linear thermal expansion coefficient (α).
Equation 3.16

3.2. Plutonium Analysis

𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸 ∙ Δ𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝛼𝛼

3.2.1. Plutonium Vector

In order to obtain a realistic plutonium vector, a real world fuel design must be

used. An innovative metallic fuel design from Lightbridge (40) will produce elevated 238Pu
content in its used fuel. Previously, the Lightbridge fuel has been referred to as

“proliferation resistant” (41) and may achieve a significant concentration of 238Pu to
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decrease material attractiveness. Lightbridge fuel has an initial high 235U enrichment
(19.7% 235U) and relatively high fuel burnup (191 MWd/kg).

Using ORIGEN2 software, the Lightbridge fuel was simulated for a pressurized

water reactor. Table 3.1 shows the resulting plutonium vector (42).
Table 3.1: Plutonium Vector
Isotope
238Pu
239Pu
240Pu
241Pu
242Pu

wt. %
18.14
35.66
21.08
13.54
11.58

The plutonium will be alloyed with 5 at. % gallium and has a density of 15.8 g/cm3.

3.2.2. Modeling Based Analysis
3.2.2.1. Models

Kessler’s high technology model will be used initially to redo Kessler’s analysis

using the plutonium vector in Table 3.2 and updated material properties. Updated decay

heat contributions from each plutonium vector will be used to ensure the correct amount
of heat generation is being analyzed. The results can then be compared to Kessler’s.
Table 3.2: Kessler's Plutonium Vector
Isotope
238Pu
239Pu
240Pu
241Pu
242Pu
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wt. %
8.7
30.1
30.6
11.3
19.3

In addition, this analysis will use two models for the steady state heat transfer

analysis. The most realistic of these models will be used for the transient heat transfer
analysis. Each model will be slightly modified to maintain the keff when the plutonium

vector in Table 3.1 is used. The keff for each model is found using kcode within the software
MCNP (43).

Model One is based on Fat Man. Fat Man is the only plutonium based nuclear

weapon used in warfare and thus represents a logical realistic case to consider. The

geometry of the model is well known. The keff of the original design is 0.98. Table 3.3 shows

the radial thickness of each shell in the initial Fat Man geometry (4) and the updated

geometry (42). Pu is plutonium. Unat is natural uranium. BPE is borated polyethylene. Al is

aluminum. PBX 9502 is the polymer bonded explosives. The updated geometry contains

more plutonium mass because the original geometry contained weapons grade plutonium
rather than the less fissile plutonium vector used in the updated geometry. The borated
polyethylene was removed from the updated geometry as the heat produced by the
plutonium would melt it.

Table 3.3: Model One Initial and Updated Geometries
Material
Neutron
Initiator
Pu
Unat
BPE
Al
PBX 9502
Steel casing

Radial Thickness
[cm]
Initial
Updated
1

3.6
6.5
0.33
12.07
47
1
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-

5.105
5
12.40
47
1

Although this design is relatively large, Model One represents a limiting case. The

larger outer surface area of the geometry will lead to a reduction in the temperatures
within the materials.

Model Two is considered to be the most realistic design. This model features a

minimum amount of plutonium and has a significantly lower keff than Model One. The lower
plutonium mass will generate less heat and represents an important limiting case. The keff
of Model Two is 0.66. The only change between the initial and updated models is the

expansion of the plutonium shell inward. Table 3.4 shows the radial thickness of each shell
in the initial model (44) and the updated model (42).

Table 3.4: Model Two Initial and Updated Geometries
Material
Inner
cavity
Pu
Be
Udep
PBX 9502
Al casing

Radial Thickness
[cm]
Initial
Updated
4.25
0.75
2
3
10
1

3.715
1.285
2
3
10
1

3.2.2.2. Steady State Heat Transfer
The temperature will be found analytically for each model using the theory

described in the Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer section. The temperature within

the high explosives will be compared to its self-explosion temperature to assess whether

self-explosion will occur.

Although the α and β decay heat from each plutonium isotope has previously been

assumed to be the main contributor to the heat generation, other decay heat contributor
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will be considered. The heat generation due to gamma rays and spontaneous fission

(including gamma rays, neutrons, fission fragments, and induced fission) will be considered
in each layer. The gamma ray emissions from the plutonium will found using the software
RadSrc. RadSrc takes radionuclide content and age in years as inputs and outputs the

decayed content as an MCNP usable gamma ray emission spectrum (45). MCNP is then
used to find the energy deposition from the sources previously described with the

exception of the fission fragments. The energy deposition from the fission fragments is
found using the average energy of the fission fragments (46).
3.2.2.3. Transient Heat Transfer

Although a steady state transfer analysis will determine if the heat generation is

significant enough to cause the high explosives to reach its self-explosion temperature, this
analysis will not yield a time limit at which this temperature is met. This information is
crucial as it serves as a time window within which the model is usable even with the

increased heat generation. In order to find this limit, a transient heat transfer model must
be used.

Matlab is used to create a computational model of the most realistic model (Model

Two). The theory described in the Transient Conductive Heat Transfer section will be used
to “step” through time and space to create the temperature throughout the model over

time. The changes in temperature over time will also be used to calculate the maximum
thermal stress (Equation 3.16) in each of the shells to determine if any deformation or
failure will occur. Deformation or failure with an HNED would cause a nonuniform

implosion leading to a reduction in the overall yield and could possibly reduce the weapon
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to a radiological dispersal device. The transient heat transfer will be considered for four
unique scenarios (42).

In the first scenario, the plutonium pit is inserted into the HNED. Prior to insertion,

the HNED is at room temperature and the plutonium pit is in thermal equilibrium with the

surrounding room. Post insertion, the HNED is stationary within a large room and the heat
is transferred at the surface of the HNED by way of natural convection and radiative heat
transfer.

In the second scenario, the plutonium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen prior

to insertion. As in scenario 1, the HNED is at room temperature however the plutonium pit
is in thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen. Post insertion, the HNED is again

stationary within a large room and the heat is transferred at the surface by way of natural
convection and radiative heat transfer.

In the third scenario, the plutonium pit is inserted into an externally cooled HNED.

Prior to insertion, the HNED is at thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen surrounding
it and the plutonium pit is at thermal equilibrium with the surrounding room. Post
insertion, the HNED remains externally cooled by liquid nitrogen.

In the fourth scenario, the fully assembled, liquid nitrogen cooled HNED is removed

and place into a large room. The initial temperature profile of scenario 4 is the final

temperature profile of scenario 3. Once the HNED is removed, heat is transferred at its
surface by way of natural convection and radiative heat transfer.
3.2.3. Figure of Merit Analysis

In order to make a broader statement regarding the plutonium vector’s material

attractiveness, the FOM described in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 will be calculated for
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this plutonium vector. The resulting FOM values will be compared to the ranges shown in
Table 2.1. In order to put the results in perspective, the FOM will be calculated for two

additional plutonium vectors; one from a typical light water reactor (LWR) used fuel and
the other from mixed oxide (MOX) used fuel. Table 3.5 shows these vectors (47).
Table 3.5: Addition Plutonium Vectors [wt. %]
Isotope
238Pu
239Pu
240Pu
241Pu
242Pu

LWR
2.00
41.3
27.6
19.2
9.91

MOX
3.17
43.7
22.2
17.0
13.9

Each of the four components of the FOM equation: bare critical mass, dose rate, heat

generation, and spontaneous fission neutron generation rate must be calculated. The bare
critical mass will be found using kcode within MCNP. The geometry is a bare sphere of

metallic plutonium surrounded by air. The mass will be slightly modified until the mass is

critical (keff=1). The heat generation is found by combining the plutonium vectors with the

decay heat per unit mass of each plutonium isotope. Similarly, the spontaneous fission rate

is found by combining the plutonium vectors with the spontaneous fission neutron

generation rate per unit mass of each plutonium isotope. MCNP will be used to find the

dose rate of 0.2 the bare critical mass from 1 meter. Using the gamma ray spectrum from
RadSrc for each plutonium vector, MCNP will calculate the dose rate 1 meter from the
surface of a metallic plutonium sphere having 0.2 the bare critical mass.

In addition to calculating the FOM values, contributions from possible sources of

uncertainty must be accounted for. Although the bare critical mass is found

computationally using MCNP6, the result is dependent on the cross section libraries chosen
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for each isotope. Using a technique previously used at Los Alamos National Laboratory
(48), the bare critical mass will be calculated using several cross section libraries. The

resulting masses will be averaged and their standard deviation is used as the uncertainty.
The decay heat values are calculated using decay data from KAERI (21) and data used in

plutonium denaturing studies done by a research groups in Tokyo (24). The spontaneous

fission values are calculated by using the spontaneous fission rates from the book “Passive

Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials” (23) and from the studies from the Tokyo

Institute of Technology mentioned previously (24). As with the bare critical mass values,
the decay heat values and spontaneous fission values will be averaged and the standard
deviation will be used as the uncertainty for each. The dose rate is calculated entirely
computationally in MCNP6 such that the computational uncertainty is negligible.
3.3. Uranium Analysis

3.3.1. Uranium Vectors

Two unique sets of uranium vectors are used in the analysis. The first set is an initial

mixture of 232U and natural uranium enriched to various concentrations of 235U for various

applications. The second set are similar to the first set in terms of 235U enrichment, but do

not contain 232U and have the same 235U/238U. The second set will be used to illustrate the

effects of the introduction of 232U on various safety, security and safeguards measurements.
For the first set, the initial mixture is 0.029 wt. % 232U and natural uranium. This

initial mixture was chosen because preliminary calculations concluded that the amount of
232U

when enriched to weapons grade from this initial mixture was sufficient to cause self-

explosion in the high explosives of a HNED model. The mixture is enriched to

approximately 3, 5, 20, 90 at. % 235U. The 3 and 5 at. % vectors represent reactor grade
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uranium. The 20 at. % vector represents the limit above which uranium is classified as

HEU. The 90 at. % vector represents weapons grade uranium. The enrichment of the initial

vector was simulated via MSTAR. MSTAR is a software program currently developed at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory that takes an initial concentration of the various uranium

isotope and a final concentration of 235U and outputs the final concentration of the other
uranium isotopes (49). Table 3.6 shows the uranium vectors that include 232U.
Table 3.6: Uranium Vectors with 232U [wt. %]

Isotope

Initial

3%

5%

20%

90%

232U

0.029
0.005
0.702
99.263

0.179
0.028
2.940
96.853

0.310
0.043
4.741
94.706

1.330
0.180
19.805
78.714

6.241
0.930
89.844
2.985

234U
235U
238U

Table 3.7 shows the uranium vectors that do not include 232U.

Table 3.7: Uranium Vectors without 232U [wt. %]

Isotope

Initial

3%

5%

20%

90%

234U

0.005
0.702
99.292

0.028
2.945
97.027

0.044
4.956
95.027

0.183
20.066
79.751

0.992
95.824
3.184

235U
238U

Not only are these fresh uranium vectors to be considered, but also the vectors as

they age. Considering the relative rapid increase in heat generation and dose rate over

time, each uranium vector will be analyzed at three time intervals: 0 year, 0.5 year, and 10

years. The gamma ray spectrum and intensities as well as the isotopic composition of each
vector is found using RadSrc (45).
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3.3.2. Model Based Analysis
3.3.2.1. Model

The uranium model based analysis will only utilize one HNED model. This model is

similar to Model Two in the plutonium analysis. The model is considered realistic as it has a
minimal amount of uranium mass. Considering this is an HNED model, the “90%” uranium
vector in Table 3.6 is used. Considering this uranium vector is different than the weapons
grade uranium originally in the design, the model is slightly modified to maintain the keff.
According to MCNP’s kcode, the keff of this model is 0.69. Table 3.8 shows the initial (44)

and update models. The inner cavity contains dry air. The U is the uranium weapons pit.

The Be is the beryllium. The Udep is depleted uranium. The PBX 9502 is the polymer bonded
high explosives. The Al casing is the aluminum casing.

Table 3.8: Uranium HNED Initial and Updated Models
Material
Inner
cavity
U
Be
Udep
PBX 9502
Al casing

Radial Thickness
[cm]
Initial
Updated
5.77
1.23
2
3
10
1

5.897
1.102
2
3
10
1

3.3.2.2. Steady State Heat Transfer
The temperature will be found analytically for the updated model in Table 3.8 using

the theory described in the Steady State Conductive Heat Transfer section. The

temperature within the high explosives will be compared to its self-explosion temperature
to assess whether self-explosion will occur.
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Considering the heat generation contributions for sources besides α and β decay are

calculated in the plutonium steady state heat transfer analysis, these contributions will

only be included in the uranium analysis if their contributions are significant in comparison
to the heat generation from α and β decay. Otherwise, these contributions are considered
negligible.

3.3.2.3. Transient Heat Transfer
As with the plutonium model based analysis, time dependent must also be

considered in the case of uranium. Matlab is used to create a computational model of the

model. This computational approach is the same as in the plutonium analysis with slightly

different geometry and materials. The maximum thermal stress as a result in the changes in
temperature is also calculated and compared to the material tensile strength in order to
determine if deformation or failure will occur. The same four scenarios are considered
here.

In the first scenario, the uranium pit is inserted into the HNED. Prior to insertion,

the HNED is at room temperature and the uranium pit is in thermal equilibrium with the

surrounding room. Post insertion, the HNED is stationary within a large room and the heat
is transferred at the surface of the HNED by way of natural convection and radiative heat
transfer.

In the second scenario, the uranium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen prior

to insertion. As in scenario 1, the HNED is at room temperature however the uranium pit is
in thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen. Post insertion, the HNED is again

stationary within a large room and the heat is transferred at the surface by way of natural
convection and radiative heat transfer.
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In the third scenario, the uranium pit is inserted into an externally cooled HNED.

Prior to insertion, the HNED is at thermal equilibrium with the liquid nitrogen surrounding
it and the uranium pit is at thermal equilibrium with the surrounding room. Post insertion,
the HNED remains externally cooled by liquid nitrogen.

In the fourth scenario, the fully assembled, liquid nitrogen cooled HNED is removed

and placed into a large room. The initial temperature profile of scenario 4 is the final

temperature profile of scenario 3. Once the HNED is removed, heat is transferred at its
surface by way of natural convection and radiative heat transfer.
3.3.3. Figure of Merit Analysis

In order to make a broader statement regarding the material attractiveness with the

addition 232U in uranium materials, the FOM equations found in Equation 2.1 and Equation

2.2 are applied. Considering the FOM equations only apply to direct use nuclear materials,

only the weapons grade uranium vector containing 232U can be used. Since two components
of the FOM equations (dose rate and heat generation) increase over time, the FOM values
for the uranium vector will be calculated at 0 year, 0.5 year, and 10 years. This will

illustrate how the material attractiveness changes over time and if/when the uranium
materials will become unattractive for weapons purposes.

The methods used to calculate each of the four components of the FOM equation;

bare critical mass, dose rate, heat generation, and spontaneous fission neutron generation
rate, are as follows. The bare critical mass will be found using kcode within MCNP. The

geometry is a bare sphere of metallic uranium surrounded by air. The mass will be slightly
modified until the mass is critical (keff=1). The heat generation is found by combining the

uranium vectors with the decay heat per unit mass of each uranium isotope. Similarly, the
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heat generation is found by combining the uranium vectors with the spontaneous fission

neutron generation rate per unit mass of each uranium isotope. MCNP will be used to find
the dose rate of 0.2 the bare critical mass from 1 meter. Using the gamma ray spectrum

from RadSrc for each uranium vector, MCNP will calculate the dose rate 1 meter from the
surface of a metallic uranium sphere having 0.2 the bare critical mass.

As in the case of the plutonium analysis, the sources of uncertainties must be

accounted for. For the bare critical mass, multiple cross section libraries within MCNP6 are

used to calculate multiple bare critical mass values. The spontaneous fission rate is

calculated using the values in the book “Passive Nondestructive Assay of Nuclear Materials”
(23) and using the software Sources 4C (50). These values are averaged and the standard

deviation is used as the uncertainty. Considering the decay heat includes 232U daughter

products, there is no easily assessable data to compare and include in the uncertainty. As

with the plutonium analysis, the uncertainty from the dose rate is negligible. These values
are averaged and the standard deviation is used as the uncertainty.
3.3.4. Enrichment Issues

The relatively large alpha emission of 232U within gaseous UF6 could cause major

enrichment issues. Calculating the number of UF6 molecules destroyed per time will gives
insight into the magnitude of these issues. Approximately 9 UF6 molecules are destroyed

per every keV deposited. Combining this with the average alpha particle energy released by
232U

(5301.6 keV) (21) and the activity of 232U in Becquerel will yield the rate of destruction

of UF6 molecules. Equation 3.17 shows the relationship between the number of UF6

molecules destroyed per second (U) and the activity of the 232U (A) and the average energy
of the alpha particle emitted by 232U (E) (51).
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Equation 3.17
𝑈𝑈 = 9𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

Equation 3.17 will be applied to the uranium vectors shown in Table 3.6. This will

show the effect of 232U’s alpha decay at various stages of the enrichment process.
3.3.5. Effects on Safety

Although the dose rate from 232U is considered a proliferation resistant feature,

elevated dose rate in materials used in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle pose operational

challenges. Higher dose rates lead to higher and more expensive precautions to protect
workers. In order to utilize 232U in a fuel cycle for nonproliferation considerations, the
safety aspects of such use must be considered.

Three basic models found in a nuclear fuel cycle will be used: a UO2 fuel pellet, a UO2

fuel rod, and a can of powdered UO2. These models will contain the uranium vectors shown

in Table 3.6 (excluding the weapons grade vector). The dose rate from each model with

each vector at 1 m will be calculated using MCNP. As mentioned previously, the gamma ray

emissions will change over time and will be considered at time intervals of 0 year, 0.5 year,
and 10 years. These dose rates will then be compared to set standards.

For completeness, the dose rate from neutron emissions will also be included. Both

spontaneous fission neutrons and (α,n) neutrons must be included. In the case of the
spontaneous fission neutron emissions, the source definition parameter is set to SF
(spontaneous fission) and MCNP will calculate the dose rate from 1 meter from

spontaneous fission neutrons. Since the (α,n) neutron energy spectrum is unique to the
specific isotopic and elemental composition of the material, the spectrum must first be
generated and input into MCNP. Sources 4C is utilized to calculate the (α,n) neutron
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spectrum. Sources 4C is a program that takes the elemental and actinide composition of the
material and outputs the (α,n) energy spectrum and yield (50).

The fuel pellet model consists of solid UO2 with a density of 10.96 g/cm3 (30)

surrounded by dry air. The model has a height of 1 cm and a diameter of 1 cm (52). Figure
3.1 shows the MCNP UO2 fuel pellet geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air.

Figure 3.1: UO2 Fuel Pellet Model
The fuel rod model consists of 400 fuel pellets stacked on one another surrounded

by zirconium alloy cladding. The fuel pellets are identical to the one shown in Figure 3.1

with a density of 10.96 g/cm3 and a radius and height of 1 cm. The total length of the fuel

rod is 400 cm. The rod is surrounded by zirconium alloy cladding with a thickness of 0.06
cm (53) and a density of 6.5 g/cm3 (30). Figure 3.2 shows a cross-sectional view of the
MCNP UO2 fuel rod geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air. The blue is the
cladding.
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Figure 3.2: UO2 Fuel Rod Model
The can of powdered UO2 consists of UO2 with a density of 2.5 g/cm3. The outer

radius and height are 5.23 cm. The steel can is 0.39 cm thick and has a density of 7.8 g/cm3.
These dimensions were chosen as they allow the can to contain approximately 990 g of

uranium and is consistent with UISO standards (54). Figure 3.3 shows the MCNP UO2 can
geometry. The red is the UO2. The yellow is dry air. The orange is the can.
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Figure 3.3: UO2 Can Model
3.3.6. Effects on Security

The introduction of 232U in uranium material will increase the detectability of the

material and thus benefits security measures. Considering the energetic gamma rays of 232U
daughter products and the relatively high spontaneous fission neutron emission rate of

232U,

the presence of 232U will increase the ability to detect the material by way of both

gamma ray and neutron detectors.

The model used in the security analysis is a sphere of metallic uranium with a 5.39

cm radius. The security model has a density of 19.05 g/cm3 and total uranium mass of 12.5

kg. This mas was chosen as it is similar to ½ of a significant quantity (12.5 kg) (11). The

analysis will include the model unshielded and surrounded by 1 cm of lead shielding with a
density of 11.3 g/cm3. The model will be analyzed first with the weapons grade (90%)

vector with 232U. Then the analysis will be repeated for the weapons grade (90%) vector
without 232U in order to illustrate the effect the introduction of 232U had on the overall

detectability of the material. This model was chosen as the major focus of security to detect
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covert smuggling of direct use materials. Figure 3.4 shows the shielded security model. The
red is the metallic uranium. The green is the lead. The yellow is dry air.

Figure 3.4: Security Model
The gamma detector chosen for this analysis is a NaI-Tl detector. This detector

consists of a solid 4”x4”x16” block of NaI-Tl with a density of 2.7 g/cm3 incased in a 0.04”

shell of aluminum. It was chosen because its high-efficiency is more important for security

purposes than energy resolution. Figure 3.5 shows the gamma detector used here.
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Figure 3.5: 4x4x16 NaI-Tl Detector
The gamma detector is 10 meters from the surface of the model and oriented such

that the 4”x16” side faced the model. This configuration is simulated in MCNP6 using

gamma ray spectra from RadSrc. The final spectrum will include a background spectrum

taken by this detector within a concrete building at Virginia Commonwealth University in
Richmond, Virginia. The measurement time for the spectra are 5 minutes.

The neutron detector utilized here has four 3He tubes surrounded by high density

polyethylene (HDPE). This detector will count the number of neutrons, rather than create

an energy spectrum. Each 3He tube has a height of 32” and a radius of 1” at a pressure of 4

atm. The outer dimensions of the HDPE are 7.22”x7.15”x47.5”. The detector is 10 meters

from the model and oriented such that the sides of the 3He tubes face the model. Figure 3.6
shows the neutron security detector model in MCNP6. The purple is the 3He. The green is

the HDPE. The yellow is dry air.
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Figure 3.6: Neutron Security Detector
As with the gamma ray measurements, the model shown in Figure 3.4 will first be

measured for 5 minutes with the weapons grade (90%) vector with 232U. The results will
then be compared to the results from the same 5-minute measurement interval with the
weapons grade (90%) vector without 232U. The total number of neutrons from each

measurement plus the estimated background counts are compared to quantify the increase
in neutron detectability from the introduction of 232U.
3.3.7. Effects on Safeguards

In order to implement uranium materials containing 232U into civilian nuclear fuel

cycles, the effects on safeguards measurements must be explored. Basic nondestructive

assay safeguards techniques of both gamma rays and neutrons are used to determine their
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effectiveness on uranium materials containing 232U. The can model in Figure 3.3 is used for
this analysis.

The gamma ray technique used here is a method to calculate the enrichment of 235U

in the sample. This method compared the ratio of the intensity of the 185.7 keV 235U peak

to the 1001 keV 234mPa. The 234mPa peak can be used in place of a 238U peak because 238U is
in secular equilibrium with 234mPa at the time intervals considered in this study (0.5 year

and 10 years). Equation 3.10 shows the ratio of the peak areas of the 235U and 238U without
232U

to the ratio of the peak areas of the 235U and 238U with 232U (23). This technique is

applied to each of the pairs of uranium vectors shown in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 excluding
the 90% vectors.
Equation 3.18

1=

235

𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑈𝑈−232
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑈𝑈−232

238

235

𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑈𝑈−232
𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑈𝑈−232

238

The intensity of each of the peaks is found via the three-window extraction

technique. The three-window extraction technique calculates the net peak area by

calculating and subtracting the continuum from the peak (55). The continuum is calculated
by forming two windows on both sides of the peak. Equation 3.19 shows the continuum
counts (B) as a function of the number of bins in the peak’s region (N), the number of

counts in the region to the left (B1), the number of bins in the region to the left (n1), the

number of counts in the region to the right (B2), and the number of bins in the region to the
right (n2).
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Equation 3.19
1 𝐵𝐵1 𝐵𝐵2
𝐵𝐵 = 𝑁𝑁 � + �
2 𝑛𝑛1 𝑛𝑛2

As shown in Equation 3.20, the continuum counts calculated in Equation 3.19 (B) is

subtracted from the gross counts in the peak region (P), yielding the net peak area (S).

Equation 3.20

𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝐵𝐵

A 2”x2” HPGe detector is chosen for the safeguards measurements, because of its

high energy resolution which allows for easy identification and analysis of the 235U and 238U
peaks. MCNP6 is used to generate a gamma ray spectrum and the measurements are 5
minutes.

The neutron techniques chosen here are active and passive neutron

coincidence/multiplicity counting. Both techniques seek to quantify the mass of uranium in
the sample. An active measurement refers to a measurement in which the sample is being
irradiated by a source during the measurement, in this case with neutrons. A passive

measurement refers to a measurement in which the sample is being measured without an
external source of radiation. Typically, neutron measurements on uranium materials are
active because the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of naturally occurring

uranium isotopes are relatively low. However, passive measurements of uranium materials
have been shown effective in calculating the 238Ueff mass (56).

A brief review neutron multiplicity basics is useful in understanding the analyses

used here. Considering neutrons are released in multiples from fission events, the detection
of these multiples can be related to the mass of material being measured. The detection of a
single neutron is known as a singles count (S). The detection of two neutrons closely
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correlated in time is known as a doubles count (D). The detection of three neutrons closely

correlated in time is known as a triples count (T).

Passive neutron measurements can be used to calculate an “effective” mass,

typically of the isotope with a notable contribution to the neutron generation rate. In this
analysis, the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) and 232U mass (m232 eff) are used. Equation 3.21
shows the relationship between the k value for the 23xU isotope (k23x238) and the

spontaneous fission rate per unit mass of the 23xU isotope (F0_23x), the second spontaneous
fission factorial moment of the 23xU isotope (νs2_23x), the spontaneous fission rate per unit

mass of 238U (F0_238), and the second spontaneous fission factorial moment of 238U (νs2_238).

Equation 3.21

238
=
𝑘𝑘23𝑥𝑥

𝐹𝐹0_23𝑥𝑥 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_23𝑥𝑥
𝐹𝐹0_238 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_238

Equation 3.22 shows the relationship between the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) and

the k values of each uranium isotope and the mass of each uranium isotope.
Equation 3.22

238
238
238
𝑚𝑚238 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑘𝑘232
𝑚𝑚232 + 𝑘𝑘234
𝑚𝑚234 + 𝑘𝑘235
𝑚𝑚235 + 𝑚𝑚238

Equation 3.23 shows the relationship between the k value for the 23xU isotope

(k23x232) and the spontaneous fission rate per unit mass of the 23xU isotope (F0_23x), the

second spontaneous fission factorial moment of the 23xU isotope (νs2_23x), the spontaneous
fission rate per unit mass of 232U (F0_232), and the second spontaneous fission factorial
moment of 232U (νs2_232).
Equation 3.23

232
𝑘𝑘23𝑥𝑥
=

𝐹𝐹0_23𝑥𝑥 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_23𝑥𝑥
𝐹𝐹0_232 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2_232
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Equation 3.24 shows the relationship between the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) and

the k values of each uranium isotope and the mass of each uranium isotope. The k23223x is

the ratio of the spontaneous fission rate per mass of 23xU to the spontaneous fission rate
per mass of 232U.
Equation 3.24
232
232
232
𝑚𝑚232 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑚𝑚232 + 𝑘𝑘234
𝑚𝑚234 + 𝑘𝑘235
𝑚𝑚235 + 𝑘𝑘238
𝑚𝑚238

Equation 3.25 shows the relationship between the effective 238U mass (m238 eff) with

the singles counts (S), doubles counts (D), detector efficiency (ε), doubles gate fraction (fd),

leakage multiplication factor (ML), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi1),
the second factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi2), the first factorial spontaneous
fission multiplicity of 238U (νs2), and the spontaneous fission yield of 238U (F0) (56).
Equation 3.25

𝑚𝑚238 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

2𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − 1)𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 𝑆𝑆
−
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
=
𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹0 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2

Equation 3.26 shows the relationship between the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) with

the singles counts (S), doubles counts (D), detector efficiency (ε), doubles gate fraction (fd),

leakage multiplication factor (ML), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi1),
the second factorial induced fission multiplicity of 235U (νi2), the first factorial spontaneous
fission multiplicity of 232U (νs2), and the spontaneous fission yield of 232U (F0).
Equation 3.26

𝑚𝑚232 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

2𝐷𝐷 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 (𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 − 1)𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 𝑆𝑆
−
𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
=
𝜀𝜀𝐹𝐹0 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2
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Equation 3.27 shows the relationship between the doubles gate fraction (fd) as a

function of the pre-delay gate width (P), the gate width (G), and the neutron die-away time
(τ).

Equation 3.27
𝑃𝑃

𝐺𝐺

𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 = 𝑒𝑒 − 𝜏𝜏 (1 − 𝑒𝑒 − 𝜏𝜏 )

The leakage multiplications (ML) is calculated using three coefficients (a, b, c).

Considering the coefficients contain values specific to the uranium isotope whose effective
mass is being calculated, it must be calculated for both the 238U and 232U effective masses.

Equation 3.28 shows the relationship between the leakage multiplication (ML) and the
coefficients (a, b, c).
Equation 3.28

𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 + 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿2 + 𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿3 = 0

Equation 3.29 shows the relationship between a and the singles counts (S), the

triples counts (T), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial

induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi3), the
second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous

fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the triples gate fraction (ft).
Equation 3.29

𝑎𝑎 = −

6𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑠𝑠2 (𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1)
𝜀𝜀 2 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 )

Equation 3.30 shows the relationship between b and the singles counts (S), the

doubles counts (D), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial
induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi13), the
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second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous

fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the doubles gate fraction (fd).
Equation 3.30

2𝐷𝐷[𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3 (𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1 − 1) − 3𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 ]
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 )

𝑏𝑏 =

Equation 3.31 shows the relationship between c and the singles counts (S), the

doubles counts (D), the first factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi1), the second factorial
induced fission multiplicity (νi2), the third factorial induced fission multiplicity (νi13), the
second factorial spontaneous fission multiplicity (νs2), the third factorial spontaneous

fission multiplicity (νs3), the efficiency of the detector (ε), and the doubles gate fraction (fd).
Equation 3.31

𝑐𝑐 =

6𝐷𝐷𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2
−1
𝜀𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝑆(𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠2 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖3 − 𝜈𝜈𝑠𝑠3 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖2 )

Table 3.9 shows the induced fission multiplicities of 235U and the spontaneous

fission multiplicities of 238U. These values for 232U will be obtained using MCNP6.
Table 3.9: Induced and Spontaneous Fission Multiplicities

235U
238U
232U

νi1
2.69
-

νi2
6.17
-

νi3
11.57
-

νs1
1.99
1.71

νs2
2.87
2.34

νs3
2.82
2.33

The neutron die away time is related to the detector configuration and is often cited

from a known value. However, an MCNP output can also be used to calculate it. The doubles
counts from two gate widths (one is the standard gate width for that detector (G) and the

other is half the standard gate width) are used to calculate the neutron die away time.

Equation 3.32 shows the relationship between the neutron die away time (τ) to the shorter
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gate width (G1), the normalized doubles counts from the shorter gate (D1), and the
normalized doubles counts from the longer gate (D2).
Equation 3.32

𝜏𝜏 =

𝐺𝐺1
𝐷𝐷
ln �𝐷𝐷2 − 1�
1

Similarly, the efficiency can also be calculated via MCNP. Equation 3.33 shows the

relationship between the efficiency (ε) and the normalized singles counts (Snorm) and the
net multiplication (Mnet).
Equation 3.33

𝜀𝜀 =

𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

The passive technique described here will first be used to calculate the effective 238U

mass and then the effective 232U mass. These masses will be compared to the known value.

The can model with the uranium vectors that do not include 232U are simulated to calculate
an effective 238U mass in each case. This will be repeated with the uranium vectors

including 232U and both the 238U and 232U effective masses will be used.

Active neutron coincidence counting is a bit more simplistic. The doubles counts

from the same detector and sample configuration have a linear relationship to the 235U

mass, for small multiplication values (56). Multiple samples having the same geometry and

mass but various 235U concentrations can be measured and related to the 235U mass.

Repeating this procedure for each of the uranium vectors containing 232U in the can model

will illustrate the methods effectiveness at verifying 235U mass despite the presence of 232U.
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The major source of uncertainty are the singles, doubles, and triples counts. The

computational uncertainties from the MCNP6 simulations are not related to the

uncertainties expected in a real world measurement. In order to estimate the uncertainties
of a real world measurement, a technique developed by Dr. Croft will be used (57).

Equation 3.34 shows the relationship between the singles count rate uncertainty (σs) and
the singles count rate (Sr), the measurement time (t), the doubles count rate (Dr), and the
doubles gate fraction (fd).

Equation 3.34

𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟 2𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟
𝜎𝜎𝑆𝑆 = � +
𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 𝑡𝑡

Equation 3.35 shows the relationship between the doubles count rate uncertainty

(σD) and the gate width (G), the doubles gate fraction (fd), the neutron die away time (τ),
the singles count rate (Sr), the doubles count rate (Dr), and the measurement time (t).
Equation 3.35

𝐺𝐺

1 − 𝑒𝑒 − 𝜏𝜏 𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟
𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟 + 2𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟2 𝐺𝐺
𝜎𝜎𝐷𝐷 = �(1 + 8(1 −
)(
))
𝐺𝐺
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑
𝑡𝑡
𝜏𝜏

Equation 3.36 shows the relationship between the triples count rate (σT), which is

Equation 3.36
𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇
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The Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) is used for both the passive and active

simulations. Although the AWCC has primarily an active configuration, the neutron sources
can be removed making it a passive configuration. The AWCC has 42 3He tubes embedded
in HDPE. The sample cavity is 20 cm in diameter and can be adjusted from 23 to 35 cm in

height. In its active configuration, the AWCC has two AmLi neutron sources (58). The AWCC
can be operated in two modes; thermal or fast mode. In fast mode, a cadmium sleeve is
used to remove thermal neutrons thus preventing them from scattering back into the

sample and inducing fission. The cadmium sleeve is removed in thermal mode (59). The
MCNP6 model of the AWCC used for this analysis is in fast mode.
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4.1. Plutonium Analysis

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1.1. Model Based Analysis

This section contains both the steady state and transient temperature profiles of the

various models described earlier. The plutonium vector shown in Table 3.1 is utilized in the
weapons pit of each model with the exception of the Kessler comparison.

Figure 4.1 shows the steady state temperature profile of Kessler’s high technology

model from Figure 2.1 with the plutonium vector shown in Table 3.2. The temperature

within the high explosives does surpass the self-explosion temperature. This self-explosion

would render the HNED useless. Kessler’s plutonium vector has less than half the 238Pu

concentration as the plutonium vector from the Lightbridge fuel simulation. However, the
temperature barely reaches the self-explosion temperature and as previously discussed,
Kessler’s model does not represent a limiting case. Therefore, the 238Pu concentration in

Kessler’s plutonium vector would not be enough to reach the self-explosion temperature in
the high explosive of a more limiting case HNED.
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Figure 4.1: Steady State Temperature Profile of Kessler's Model (60)
The decay heat contribution from the plutonium vector in Table 4.1 in each layer of

Model One is shown Table 4.1. All decay heat contributions besides α and β decay within

the plutonium pit are negligible. Thus only the heat generation from α and β decay within
the plutonium pit will be included.
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Table 4.1: Decay Heat Contribution within Model One [W] (60)
spontaneous fission

Material

α/β decay

γ

Pu

8.71·102

2.80·10-1

9.68·10-4

9.09·10-4

-

1.17·10-10

5.94·10-6

2.81·10-6

Unat

1.71·10-3

PBX 9502

-

Al

Steel
casing

6.10·10-5

1.37·10-11
0.00·100

γ

2.41·10-4

3.07·10-5
2.94·10-7

n

fission
fragments

2.28·10-4

2.47·10-3

1.06·10-5

3.53·10-10

induced
fission

total

2.47·10-3

9.68·10-4

5.31·10-3

-

-

8.75·10-6

-

2.41·10-4

-

total
8.70·102

3.18·10-3

4.95·10-3

4.13·10-5

4.13·10-5

2.95·10-7

Figure 4.2 shows the steady state temperature profile of Model One. The

8.75·10-6

2.95·10-7

temperature within the high explosives reaches the self-explosion temperature, rendering
the HNED useless.
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Figure 4.2: Model One Steady State Temperature Profile (60)
Table 4.2 shows each decay heat contribution within each layer of Model Two. As in

Model One, only α and β decay within the plutonium is notable and all other decay heat
contributions are considered negligible.
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Table 4.2: Decay Heat Contributions within Model Two [W] (60)
Material

Pu
Be
Udep
PBX
9502
Al casing

4.93·102
5.29·10-4

1.58·10-1
1.91·10-5
3.35·10-5

2.14·10-6
9.21·10-8
1.57·10-6

spontaneous fission
fission
induced
n
fragments
fission
-5
-3
3.23·10
1.41·10
3.44·10-5
2.67·10-7
-6
-9
6.01·10
9.06·10
6.39·10-6

-

1.04·10-9

1.25·10-8

3.77·10-9

α/β
decay

-

γ

1.15·10-8

γ

1.12·10-7

5.11·10-7

-

-

total

1.48·10-3
3.59·10-7
1.40·10-5

4.94·102
1.94·10-5
5.77·10-4

1.63·10-8

1.73·10-8

6.23·10-7

Figure 4.3 shows the steady state temperature profile within Model Two. The

temperature within the high explosives surpasses the self-explosion temperature by nearly
100 °C. Like Model One, Model Two would be rendered useless.
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Figure 4.3: Model Two Steady State Temperature Profile (60)
The following discussion focusses on the transient heat transfer within Model Two

as a result of four different scenarios. Below is a brief review of each scenario.
•

Scenario 1: the plutonium pit reaches thermal equilibrium with surrounding room

•

then inserted into Model Two

•

into Model Two

•

Scenario 2: the plutonium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen then inserted
Scenario 3: the plutonium pit is inserted into an externally cooled Model Two

Scenario 4: the fully assembled Model Two in thermal equilibrium with liquid
nitrogen is removed and placed into a large room
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Figure 4.4 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of

Model Two from scenario 1. The temperature within the high explosives reaches the self-

explosion temperature within 7.5 hours. In order to avoid premature detonation of Model

Two, the HNED must be detonated less than 7.5 hours from the insertion of the plutonium
pit. This time frame is relatively small and not useful for deterrence purposes. An HNED
utilized for deterrence must be armed and ready quickly for an extended period of time
(months to years).
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Figure 4.4: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 1 (42)
Figure 4.5 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of

Model Two from scenario 2. As in scenario 1, the temperature within the high explosives
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reaches the self-explosion temperature within 7.5 hours. As discussed above, this time

frame is too short for deterrence purposes and would be significantly inconvenient.
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Figure 4.5: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 2 (42)
Figure 4.6 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals

of Model Two from scenario 3. The external cooling keeps the temperature well

below the high explosive temperature. Model Two could be stored externally cooled
by liquid nitrogen for an indefinite amount of time. Although this would be useful

for deterrence purposes, the costs of externally cooling Model Two for an extended

period of time would be expensive and would likely cause other challenges that
would need to be overcome.
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Figure 4.6: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 3 (42)
Figure 4.7 shows the transient temperature profile at various time intervals of

Model Two from scenario 4. Unlike in scenarios 1 and 2, the temperature reaches the selfexplosion temperature within the high explosives in slightly longer than 7.5 hours. This
scenario would also be impractical from a deterrence perspective. The results from
scenarios 1, 2, and 4 show that regardless of how the pit or HNED is cooled, natural

convective and radiative heat transfer within an empty room causes the temperature

within the high explosives to reach the self-explosion temperature too quickly for the
HNED to be useful for deterrence.
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Figure 4.7: Transient Temperature Profile of Model One Scenario 4 (42)
Figure 4.8 through Figure 4.12 show the maximum thermal stress as a function of

time within each layer of Model Two during each scenario and the tensile strength of that
material. In the aluminum and plutonium layers, the maximum stress does not reach the

tensile strength in any of the four scenarios. Thus, no plastic deformation will occur in the
aluminum or plutonium layers as a result of thermal stress. In the uranium layer, the
maximal thermal stress reaches the tensile strength in scenarios 1, 2, and 4 within

approximately 200-300 minutes. Plastic deformation will occur within the uranium in 200300 minutes in scenarios 1, 2, and 4, but no plastic deformation will occur in scenario 3. In
the high explosives and beryllium layers, the maximum thermal stress reaches the tensile
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strength in all 4 scenarios within 300 minutes. Plastic deformation will occur in the high
explosives and beryllium in all 4 scenarios. This deformation can decrease the overall

performance of Model Two by producing asymmetry within the layers. This asymmetry

will cause asymmetry within the implosion reducing the yield. Although Model Two would
likely somewhat function, the reduction of the yield may not be considered effective

depending on the adversary. In the case of a state entity, the use of a nuclear weapon that

underperforms could have dire consequences if used, because the other nuclear weapons

states will have weapons that almost certainly won’t underperform. However, in the case of
a non-state entity, the use of a nuclear weapon with any notable yield may be considered
effective.
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Figure 4.8: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Aluminum
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Figure 4.10: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Uranium
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Figure 4.11: Maximum Thermal Stress within the Beryllium
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Figure 4.12: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Plutonium
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4.1.2. Figure of Merit Analysis

In order to calculate the FOM1 and FOM2 values, each of the components must first

be calculated. Table 4.3 shows the FOM components: bare critical mass (M), heat decay (h),
spontaneous fission neutron generation rate (S), and the dose rate (D), for the plutonium
vectors from the Lightbridge fuel inspired design (LB), the light water reactor used fuel

(LWR), and the mixed oxide used fuel (MOX). The uncertainty in the bare critical mass was

found by repeating the k-code simulations using three different data libraries in MCNP6:
.60c, .65c, and .80c. Although the bare critical mass of the Lightbridge vector is slightly

lower than the LWR and MOX, the heat decay and spontaneous fission neutron generation
rate are notably higher. As expected, the dose rate is relatively low.
Table 4.3: FOM Components

M [kg]
h [W/kg]
S [n/s·kg]·105
D [rem/h]

LB
22.6 ± 0.5
104.6 ± 1.3
8.91 ± 0.11
0.0751 ± 0.0015

LWR
24.2 ± 0.2
14.6 ± 0.2
5.06 ± 0.01
0.0088 ± 0.0001

MOX
24.0 ± 0.3
24.1 ± 0.3
5.94 ± 0.01
0.0138 ± 0.0001

Table 4.4 shows the FOM values for the three plutonium vectors. As a review, FOM1

applies to less technically advanced states and FOM2 applies to technically advanced states.
In the case of less technically advanced states, all three plutonium vectors are unattractive
for weapons purposes. In the case of the technically advanced states, all three plutonium
vectors are attractive. When comparing the LB plutonium vector to the other two (LWR
and MOX), both FOM1 and FOM2 are notably lower. However, considering they still fall

within the same range, the significance of the difference between the values is debatable
and can’t give any real conclusion as to which vector is more or less attractive.
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Table 4.4: FOM Values
FOM1
FOM2

LB
0.457 ± 0.010
1.260 ± 0.023

LWR
0.720 ± 0.005
1.964 ± 0.002

MOX
0.647 ± 0.005
1.801 ± 0.002

4.2. Uranium Analysis

4.2.1. Model Based Analysis

This section analyzes the steady state and transient heat transfer within the updated

model described in Table 3.8. The weapons grade (90%) uranium vector from Table 3.6 is

used. Considering Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show that all other sources of heat are negligible,

only the heat generation from the α decay within the uranium weapons pit will be included.
In addition to the heat transfer, the dose rate to the high explosives will also be calculated.
Figure 4.13 shows the total heat generation in units of Watts over time. As the 232U

decays, its daughter products contribute additional decay heat which greatly increases the
total heat generation. This value reaches a maximum after approximately 10 years.
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Figure 4.13: Heat Generation of Weapons Pit over Time
Although the decay heat increases over time, the rate of increase is on the order of

months. As shown in the transient plutonium analysis, steady state is reached after
approximately a day, so we shall assume steady state is reached at each of the time
intervals of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 5, and 10 years.

Figure 4.14 through Figure 4.20 show the steady state temperature profiles at the

various time intervals. Even when the uranium is fresh (t=0), the temperature within the

high explosives reaches its “self-explosion” temperature. Over time, the temperature within
the model increase significantly to the point of exceeding the “self-explosion” temperature
within the high explosives by 100’s of degrees. These results show the heat generation
produced is well above what is required to render the HNED useless.

77

400

U

Be

High explosives

Udep

Casing

Self-explosion
Temperature

Temperature [°C]

300

200

100

0

5.9 7.0

9.0

12.0

22.0

Radius [cm]

Figure 4.14: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0
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Figure 4.15: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0.25 year
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Figure 4.16: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 0.5 year
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Figure 4.17: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 1 year
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Figure 4.18: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 2 years
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Figure 4.19: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 5 years
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Figure 4.20: Steady State Temperature Profile at Time Interval t = 10 years
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In addition to the effects of the heat generation on the high explosives, the dose rate

from the decay of 232U also damages the high explosives. Figure 4.21 shows the dose rate to
the high explosives over time.
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Figure 4.21: Dose Rate to the High Explosives over time
In order to obtain the total dose to the high explosives, the dose rate over time must

be integrated. Figure 4.22 shows the dose rate to the high explosives over time and the 100

MR (8.77·107 rad) degradation limit. The degradation limit is reach after approximately 2.1
years. Thus, the high explosives would begin to degrade 2.1 years after the full assembly of
the weapon. The fully assembled weapon must not be stored for longer than 2.1 years
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because the degradation of the high explosives would lead to a significant reduction of the
performance of the implosion eventually leading to total ineffectiveness of the weapon.
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Figure 4.22: Dose to the High Explosives over time
The transient heat transfer analysis will include the 4 scenarios briefly described

below. Only the fresh uranium vector (t = 0) will be analyzed, rather than include every
time interval.
•

•

Scenario 1: the uranium pit reaches thermal equilibrium with surrounding room
then inserted into the Model

Scenario 2: the uranium pit is externally cooled in liquid nitrogen then inserted into
the Model
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•

Scenario 3: the uranium pit is inserted into an externally cooled Model

•

Scenario 4: the fully assembled Model in thermal equilibrium with liquid nitrogen is
removed and placed into a large room

Figure 4.23 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 1. The

temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature after

approximately one day. This is a relatively small time frame and would require the weapon

be used the same day of the insertion of the weapons pit. For deterrence purposes, the time
frame is too short and storing the weapons pit separately would likely be impractical and
reduces the level of readiness.
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Figure 4.23: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 1
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Figure 4.24 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 2. As in scenario

1, the temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature after
approximately one day. The lower initial temperature profile of the weapons pit only
reduces the time taken to reach the self-explosion temperature by minutes. The final
conclusion is the same as in scenario 1.
400

U Be

Udep

High explosives

Casing

300
t=0
t = 1 min.

Temperature [°C]

200

t = 1 hr.
t = 6 hr.

100

t = 12 hr.
t = 1 d.
Steady State

0

Self-Explosion
Temperature
-100

-200

5.9 7.0

9.0

12.0

22.0

Radius [cm]

23.0

Figure 4.24: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 2
Figure 4.25 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 3. The external

cooling of the liquid nitrogen prevents the temperature within the high explosives from

reaching its self-explosive temperature. Although this technique is effective, continually
cooling the HNED with liquid nitrogen would be expensive and impractical.
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Figure 4.25: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 3
Figure 4.26 shows the transient temperature profile from scenario 4. As in scenario

1 and 2, the temperature within the high explosives reaches its self-explosion temperature

after approximately one day. Although Figure 4.25 shows that continually cooling the
HNED with liquid nitrogen will prevent self-explosion, once removed from the liquid
nitrogen, the HNED must be used within one day in order to avoid self-explosion.

Considering how expensive and complicated liquid nitrogen storage would be and the
limited time frame, scenario 4 would be impractical.
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Figure 4.26: Transient Temperature Profile from Scenario 4
Figure 4.27 through Figure 4.31 shows the maximum thermal stress over time and

tensile strength of each material in the HNED model. The thermal stress in the aluminum
and weapons grade uranium do not reach their tensile strength in any of the scenarios,
thus no plastic deformation will occur. The thermal stress in the high explosives and

depleted uranium reach their tensile strength within approximately an hour in scenarios 1,
2, and 3. Plastic deformation will occur in these materials causing asymmetries in the

implosion and reducing the yield. The maximum thermal stress in the beryllium reaches its
tensile strength in all four scenarios. In scenarios 1, 2, and 3, the tensile strength is reached
within an hour. In scenario 4, the tensile strength is reached within a day. In all four
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scenarios, plastic deformation will occur in at least one shell of the HNED. This plastic

deformation will reduce the yield of the HNED. The underperformance of a nuclear weapon
may discourage its use by a state entity.
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Figure 4.27: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Aluminum
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Figure 4.28: Maximum Thermal Stress in the High Explosives
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Figure 4.29: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Depleted Uranium
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Figure 4.30: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Beryllium
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Figure 4.31: Maximum Thermal Stress in the Weapons Grade Uranium
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4.2.2. Figure of Merit Analysis

In order to calculate the Figure of Merit values for the “90%” uranium isotopic

vector including 232U, each factor must be calculated. The bare critical mass is 39.0 ± 1.6 kg.
The spontaneous fission neutron generation rate is 81.7 ± 1.5 neutrons/s·kg. This value is

too low to produce a significant difference between the FOM1 and FOM2 equations, therefor
spontaneous fission neutron generation rate will be excluded from the calculation of the
Figure of Merit and the results are assumed to be applicable to both less technically

advanced and technically advanced states. Figure 4.32 shows the heat generation per mass
of the uranium material over time. As shown, the heat generation increases by more than a
factor of five over the ten year time interval. Due to limits in the available nuclear data, the
uncertainty of the heat generation is not included.
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Figure 4.32: Heat Generation per Mass vs. Time
Figure 4.33 shows the dose rate from 1 meter of 0.2 times the bare critical mass

over time. The dose rate initially increases from approximately zero rem/h to nearly 1000
rem/h over the ten year time interval. The “self-protection” dose rate of 500 rem/h is
reached after approximately 1.5 years.
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Figure 4.33: Dose Rate from 1 meter of 2/10 the Bare Critical Mass vs. Time
Figure 4.34 shows the Figure of Merit values over time. The increase in dose rate

and heat generation cause a significant decrease in the Figure of Merit value and therefor
the material attractiveness over time. After approximately 6 to 9 months, the uranium

material becomes unattractive for weapons purposes to both less technically advanced

states and technically advanced states. After 10 years, the Figure of Merit value is nearly

below one and thus the material is nearly very unattractive. This essential creates a time
limit for the weapons utility of the material. Although the material is certainly usable for

weapons purposes within the first 6 to 9 months, once the material becomes unattractive,
the 232U daughter products must be removed in order to renew the material’s weapons
96

utility. The burden of semi-annually refurbishing the uranium material in order to maintain
a level of readiness would be significant for any state. Considering the primary function of

most nuclear weapons arsenals are for deterrence purposes, the level of readiness must be
constantly maintained. Although the use of such a material for weapons purposes is not
impossible, using this material for deterrence purposes is highly impractical.
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Figure 4.34: Figure of Merit Values vs. Time
4.2.3. Enrichment Issues

Table 4.5 shows the percentage of UF6 molecules decomposed per second of each of

the uranium isotopic vectors containing 232U. Although these values may appear small, the
accumulation of UF6 decomposition over time may be significant.
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Table 4.5: Percentage of UF6 Molecules Decomposed per second
Initial
3.33·10-7

3%
2.04·10-6

5%
3.54·10-6

20%
1.48·10-5

90%
6.91·10-5

Table 4.6 shows the total percentage of UF6 molecules decomposed over various

time intervals from each uranium isotopic vectors containing 232U. These time intervals

were chosen as they represent various amounts of time gaseous UF6 may be stored in a
civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Even the percentages of UF6 decomposed after only one day

would significantly alter the enrichment process. The production of fractions of a percent
of molecules having notably lower masses into the enrichment stream would cause these

molecules to significantly increase. This would be counterproductive to the primary goal of
enrichment: increasing the concentration of 235U.

Table 4.6: Percentage of UF6 Molecules Decomposed over Various Time Intervals
Time interval
One day
One week
One month

Initial
0.03
0.20
0.87

3%
0.18
1.23
5.34

5%
0.31
2.14
9.27

20%
1.28
8.93
38.70

90%
5.97
41.81
181.18

This analysis is a preliminary simplification of the possible issues 232U may cause in

the enrichment process. Although some of the percentages in Table 4.6 are not entirely

realistic (such as the 181.18%), these values do indicate that if 232U at the concentrations
found here were introduced into the enrichment process, significant UF6 decomposition
would occur. This illustrates the magnitude of the impact 232U may have on enrichment.

Before 232U could practically be implemented into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, this impact
would need to be more thoroughly explored and additional measures must be taken in
order to effectively enrich the uranium materials containing 232U.
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4.2.4. Effects on Safety

This section will discuss the dose rate from 1 meter from the gamma ray and

neutron emissions of the pellet model shown in Figure 3.1, the rod model shown in Figure

3.2, and the can model shown in Figure 3.3. The initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% uranium isotopic
vectors with 232U from Table 3.6. Since the gamma ray emissions change drastically as the
daughter products of 232U build-up, the dose rate from the gamma rays are considered at

time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years.

Table 4.7 shows the dose rate in units of rem/h from 1 meter from the gamma

emissions of the pellet models at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years.

Table 4.7: Gamm Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of Pellet Models from 1 meter

Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
1.095·10-7
0.001
0.005

3%
6.709·10-7
0.006
0.031

5%
1.159·10-6
0.010
0.054

20%
4.839·10-6
0.040
0.225

Table 4.8 shows the dose rate in units of rem/h from 1 meter of the rod models from

the gamma emissions at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years.

Table 4.8: Gamm Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of the Rod Models from 1 meter

Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
2.545·10-6
0.038
0.215

3%
4.397·10-6
0.207
1.322

5%
2.694·10-5
0.405
2.285

20%
1.123·10-4
1.695
9.550

Table 4.9 shows the dose rates in units of rem/h from 1 meter of the can models

from the gamma emissions at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years.
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Table 4.9: Gamma Ray Dose Rate [rem/h] of Can Models from 1 meter
Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
1.909·10-5
0.402
2.263

3%
1.170·10-4
2.464
13.881

5%
2.021·10-4
4.258
23.988

20%
8.438·10-4
17.798
100.265

Considering the amount of uranium mass does not change significantly over the 10

year time interval, the neutron emissions are assumed to be constant. Table 4.10 shows the
dose rates from the neutron emissions (both spontaneous fission and (α,n)) of the pellet,
rod, and can models.

Table 4.10: Neutron Dose Rate of the Models from 1 meter

Model
Pellet
Rod
Can

Initial
8.208·10-9
3.863·10-7
4.634·10-6

3%
5.083·10-8
2.229·10-6
2.840·10-5

5%
8.689·10-8
4.091·10-6
4.909·10-5

20%
7.030·10-7
1.718·10-5
2.066·10-4

In order to compare the dose rates to the 5 rem annual limit of the United States

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the total amount of time an exposed worker would reach
this total dose limit is calculated.

Table 4.11 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the pellet models

would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem.

Table 4.11: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Pellet Models would reach 5 rem
limit
Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
26,102,530
5,539
983

3%
6,927,959
903
160

100

5%
4,012,805
523
93

20%
902,211
125
22

Table 4.12 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the rod models

would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem.

Table 4.12: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Rod Models would reach 5 rem
limit
Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
1,705,908
131
23

3%
754,593
24
4

5%
161,097
12
2

20%
38,562
3
1

Table 4.13 shows the total number of hours a worker exposed to the can models

would reach the NRC’s annual limit of 5 rem.

Table 4.13: Total Time [hours] until Worker Exposed to the Can Models would reach 5 rem
limit
Time [years]
0
0.5
10

Initial
210,782
12
2

3%
34,394
2
0

5%
19,905
1
0

20%
4,760
0
0

Assuming a 40-hour work week, the total number of hours in an entire work year is

2,080 hours. Although this number does not include possible holidays, such an

approximation is adequate for this discussion. In all three models, the dose rates initially
could not possibly reach the annual limit. However, after only 0.5 year the 3%, 5%, 20%

isotopic vector pellet models could reach the limit within a year. The rod and can models

with every isotopic vector considered here pose a significant dose rate threat at both the

0.5 and 10 year time intervals. In some cases, the 5 rem annual limit is reached within only
a few hours or even within an hour. This illustrates a significant issue with implementing
232U

at the concentrations discussed here in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Additional

shielding precautions would be essential to handling these materials and would be a
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financial burden to any state seeking to utilize these materials. This must be considered
before 232U can be utilized to reduce material attractiveness purposes.

4.2.5. Effects on Security

This section will analyze gamma ray and neutron security measurements of the

model shown in Figure 3.4 in both its non-shielded and shielded configurations.

Measurements of the 90% vector with 232U from Table 3.6 and the 90% vector without 232U
from Table 3.7 are compared. Since the scenarios considered here are the detection of a
weapon’s usable uranium material, the initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% vectors are excluded.

The gamma ray spectra found via the MCNP6 simulations of the security model and

the detector shown in Figure 3.5 at time intervals of 0, 0.5, and 10 years of the isotopic

vectors with and without 232U are shown below. The measurement time is 5 minutes and
the detector is 10 meters from the surface of the model. Figure 4.35 shows the spectra

fresh non-shielded geometries. Figure 4.36 shows the spectra from 0.5 year non-shielded

geometries. Figure 4.37 shows the spectra from 10 year non-shielded geometries. Even at

the initial time interval of 0 years, low energy peaks in the gamma ray spectrum with 232U
are clearly visible above the background spectrum. At the 0.5 and 10 year time intervals,
the spectra with 232U is several order of magnitudes above both background and the

spectra without 232U. The spectra with 232U is clearly visible and distinguishable between
that without 232U. This illustrates a significant increase in the detectability of the
weaponized uranium material via the introduction of 232U.
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Figure 4.35: Fresh non-shielded geometry
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Figure 4.36: 0.5 year non-shielded geometry
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Figure 4.37: 10 year non-shielded geometry
The results from the shielded geometries are similar to that of the non-shielded

cases. Figure 4.38 shows the spectra from the fresh shielded geometries. Figure 4.39 shows
the spectra from the 0.5 year shielded geometries. Figure 4.40 shows the spectra from 10

year shielded geometries. The lead shielding proves effective at significantly reducing the

low energy peaks in both the spectrum with and without 232U. As a result, the fresh spectra

are well below background and would be difficult to detect. However, the spectra with 232U

at 0.5 and 10 years is clearly visible above the spectra without 232U and background. The

shielding has a minimal effect on the spectra with 232U, particularly at higher energies, as
can be seen by the intensity of the 2.6 MeV 208Tl peak. This illustrates the significant

increase in detectability after the build-up of 232U daughter products is present even when

lead shielding is utilized.
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Figure 4.38: Fresh shielded geometry
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Figure 4.39: 0.5 years shielded geometry
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Figure 4.40: 10 years shielded geometry
Although the above spectra show an improvement in detectability, misidentification

of this material is possible. 228Th is found in both the 232U and 232Th decay chain. As a result,

the proceeding daughter products of 228Th are found in both the 232U materials considered
here and in nature. The detection of these daughter products from nature could lead to a

possible misidentification. In order to evaluate the impact of misidentification, additional
background measurements would be necessary. Due to the computational nature of this
study and inability to access the materials discussed in this section, additional
measurements are possibilities for future works.

The following discussion will focus on the total neutron counts from MCNP6

simulations of the neutron detector shown in Figure 3.6 10 meters from the security model.
The measurement time is 10 minutes. The 90% isotopic vectors with and without 232U are
utilized. Considering the lead shielding in the shielded geometry will have a negligible

effect on the neutron emissions, only the shielded geometry is used. The total neutron
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counts from the security model with 232U is 33 counts. The total neutron counts from the

security model without 232U is approximately 0 counts. In order to determine whether this
difference in counts is detectable, the background counts must be approximated.

The background counts are approximated by calculating the reaction rate of the

background neutrons in the 3He within the detector. Equation 4.1 shows the relationship

between the reaction rate (R) and the number of atoms (N), the neutron flux in units of
neutrons/cm2·s (ф), and the cross section in units of cm2 (σ) (6).
Equation 4.1

𝑅𝑅 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

In this analysis, the reaction rate calculated will be the total neutron count rate from

background. The number of atoms is the total number of 3He atoms within the detector:

1.984·1024. The neutron flux is the background neutron flux: approximately 0.015 n/cm2·s

(61). The neutron flux can vary by several percent (62). The value chosen here represents a
median approximation of the possible variations in neutron flux based on location. In

addition to the flux, the energy spectrum of the background neutrons can vary greatly

based on location. The presence of objects such as large concrete structures or variations in
altitude can significantly impact the spectrum of background neutrons. The detection

efficiency of 3He changes with neutron energy. Figure 4.41 shows the cross sections of

various 3He-neutron interactions as a function of neutron energy.
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Figure 4.41: 3He cross sections [barns] vs. neutron energy [eV] (63)
In neutron detectors, (n,p) interactions of the 3He produce neutron counts.

Therefore, the (n,p) cross section of 3He should be used in this analysis. Much of the

neutron background energy spectrum falls below 1 MeV. 100 barns (10-22 cm2) is chosen as

this represents the cross section near the highest end of the neutron energy spectrum thus
representing a conservative estimate. Lower energy neutrons would correspond to higher
cross sections and only increase the detection of the background neutrons. The realistic
value would depend heavily on the location of the background measurement. The value

chosen here is intended to be an approximation. Using Equation 4.1, the background count
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rate of the detector is 3 counts per second. For a 10 minute measurement, the background
counts is 1786 counts.

Table 4.14 shows the neutron counts after a 10 minute measurement of the 90%

isotopic vectors with and without 232U including background. The values are within a one-

sigma uncertainty and thus are not statistically differentiable. Unfortunately, this indicates
the introductions of 232U did not significantly increase the neutron detectability of the
material. The cross section chosen here assumed high energy background neutrons.

Additional attenuation via structures such as concrete buildings would lower the energy of
the background neutrons and thus increase the detection of these neutrons. An increase in
the detection efficiency of the background neutrons would only strengthen the conclusion
made here that the spontaneous fission of 232U will not significantly increase the neutron

detectability of uranium materials.

Table 4.14: Neutron counts with and without 232U including background
Isotopic Vector

Counts

With 232U

1,819 ± 135

Without 232U

1,786 ± 134

4.2.6. Effects on Safeguards

This section discusses gamma ray and neutron non-destructive assay safeguards

techniques. These techniques are done on the initial, 3%, 5%, and 20% uranium isotopic
vectors with 232U (Table 3.6) and without 232U (Table 3.7) at time intervals of 0.5 and 10

years. The results from the set of isotopic vectors with 232U are compared to that without
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232U

in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the techniques in the presence of 232U. Only

the can model shown in Figure 3.3 is used in this analysis.

First, a non-destructive technique using the 235U and 238U gamma ray peaks to

quantify 235U enrichment is analyzed. The set of simulations found here represent a 5

minute gamma ray measurement of the can models by a 2”x2” HPGe detector in MCNP6.

The figures include both the spectra with and without 232U as well as red dashed lines at
the 185.7 keV 235U peak and the 1001 keV 234mPa peak (utilized for 238U).

Figure 4.42 shows the initial uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U

after 0.5 year. Figure 4.43 shows the initial uranium isotopic vector spectra with and
without 232U.
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Figure 4.42: Initial uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year
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Figure 4.43: Initial uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years
Figure 4.44 shows the 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U

after 0.5 year. Figure 4.45 shows the 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without
232U

after 10 years.
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Figure 4.44: 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year
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Figure 4.45: 3% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years
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Figure 4.46 shows the 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U

after 0.5 year. Figure 4.47 shows the 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without
232U

after 10 years.
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Figure 4.46: 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year
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Figure 4.47: 5% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years
Figure 4.48 shows the 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and without 232U

after 0.5 year. Figure 4.49 shows the 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra with and
without 232U after 10 years.
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Figure 4.48: 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 0.5 year
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Figure 4.49: 20% uranium isotopic vector spectra at 10 years
As evident in all of the figures, the 235U and 238U peaks are clearly visible in the

spectra without 232U and not visible in the spectra with 232U. Considering the technique
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discussed here relies on the calculation of the net peak area of these peaks, this is the first

indication that the technique may not be effective. Using Equation 3.19 and Equation 3.20,

the net peak areas of the 235U and 238U peaks are calculated using the same regions in all of

the spectra shown above. The ratio of the peaks is input into Equation 3.18 to calculate the

ratio.

Table 4.15 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the initial uranium

isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years.

Table 4.15: Peak ratios from the initial uranium isotopic vectors

0.5 y
10 y

without 232U
With

232U

without 232U
with 232U

235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U

Counts

171,900 ± 508
112,700 ± 383
426,300 ± 1,592,520
1,328,000 ± 520,588
171,900 ± 508
113,300 ± 384
2,437,000 ± 8.544.664
7,078,000 ± 2,834.231

ratio

4.752 ± 17.850
4.406 ± 15.550

Table 4.16 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 3% uranium

isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years.

Table 4.16: Peak ratios from the 3% uranium isotopic vectors

0.5 y
10 y

without 232U
with 232U

without 232U
with 232U

235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U

Counts
717,200± 1,064
110,300 ± 404
1,304,000 ± 9,166,000
6,604,000 ± 3,030,000
717,300 ± 1,064
110,800 ± 405
46,370,000 ± 56,780,000
47,170,000 ± 18,640,000
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ratio

32.94 ± 232.00
6.58 ± 8.47

Table 4.17 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 5% uranium

isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years.

Table 4.17: Peak ratios from the 5% uranium isotopic vectors

0.5 y
10 y

without 232U
with

232U

with

232U

without 232U

235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U

Count rate

1,191,000 ± 1,407
108,000 ± 412
10,230,000 ± 17,660,000
14,270,000 ± 5,764,000
1,191,000 ± 1,407
108,600 ± 413
72,830,000 ± 99,200,000
88,510,000 ± 32,380,000

ratio

15.40 ± 27.30
13.34 ± 18.81

Table 4.18 shows the net peak area and the ratio found from the 20% uranium

isotopic vectors at time intervals of 0.5 and 10 years.

Table 4.18: Peak ratios from the 20% uranium isotopic vectors

0.5 y
10 y

without 232U
with232U

without 232U
with

232U

235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U
235U
238U

Count rate
4,819,000 ± 3,214
90,600 ± 435
41,670,000 ± 73,280,000
60,110,000 ± 23,940,000
4,819,000 ± 3,214
91,070 ± 437
316,500,000 ± 399,700,000
332,300,000 ± 133,700,000

ratio

76.34 ± 137.67
55.57 ± 73.65

As initially indicated by the spectra, the technique proves to be ineffective. The

ratios in each case disagree from unity and have large uncertainties. This is due to the

inability to precisely calculate the net peak area of the 235U and 238U peaks in the presence
of 232U and its daughter products. The high gamma source strengths of the daughter

products of 232U produce a continuum which hides the 235U and 238U peaks making them

statistically undetectable. The final ratio found is useless for quantifying 235U enrichment.
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This illustrates that this safeguards technique is not useful in the presence of 232U
concentrations discussed here.

The following analysis evaluates a passive neutron multiplicity technique to

calculate uranium mass. The singles, doubles, and triples counts from a passive AWCC 10

minutes measurement of the can models with and without 232U are utilized to calculate the
effective 232U and 238U masses. Table 4.19 shows the passives singles, doubles, and triples

counts from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.20 shows the singles, doubles,

and triples counts from the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U. The uncertainties shown
are the expected experimental uncertainties calculated using a method developed by Dr.
Croft (57).

Table 4.19: Passive singles, doubles, and triples counts from uranium isotopic vectors with
232U

Singles
Doubles
Triples

Initial
399,476 ± 637
2,070 ± 268
141 ± 61

3%
2,446,709 ± 1,576
12,581 ± 1,624
857 ± 844

5%
4,230,597 ± 2,074
23,101 ± 2,807
1,614 ± 1,909

20%
17,825,942 ± 4,272
141,074 ± 11,891
10,870 ± 16,527

Table 4.20: Passive singles, doubles, and triples counts from uranium isotopic vectors without
232U
Singles
Doubles
Triples

Initial
1,365 ± 45
214 ± 20
17 ± 6

3%
1,404 ± 45
210 ± 19
17 ± 6

5%
1,396 ± 45
209 ± 19
17 ± 6

20%
1,643 ± 47
182 ± 17
16 ± 5

The following tables show multiple variables needed to calculate the effective 232U

and 238U masses. These variables are the spontaneous fission factorial moments (νs1, νs2,

νs3), doubles gate fraction (fd), triples gate fraction (ft), efficiency (ε), and neutron die-away
(τ) time calculated. Each variable was obtained via the same MCNP6 passive simulations
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that yielded the singles, doubles, and triples counts above. Table 4.21 shows these values

for the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.22 shows these values for the uranium

isotopic vectors without 232U.

Table 4.21: Multiplicity analysis variables for uranium isotopic vectors with 232U
νs1
νs2
νs3
fd
ft
ε
τ [µs]

Initial
1.98
5.72
16.92
0.663
0.440
0.299
49.44

3%
1.94
5.60
16.68
0.663
0.439
0.299
49.49

5%
1.92
5.50
16.56
0.664
0.441
0.299
49.27

20%
1.81
5.16
16.90
0.657
0.432
0.300
50.44

Table 4.22: Multiplicity analysis variables for uranium isotopic vectors without 232U
νs1
νs2
νs3
fd
ft
ε
τ [µs]

Initial
2.72
6.33
12.07
0.659
0.434
0.325
50.20

3%
2.69
6.16
11.49
0.659
0.434
0.325
50.21

5%
2.68
6.05
11.12
0.659
0.434
0.327
50.17

20%
2.62
5.69
9.84
0.662
0.438
0.325
49.68

In order to illustrate the technique is effective in uranium materials without 232U,

the effective 238U masses (m238 eff) for the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U are

calculated using Equation 3.25 with the singles, doubles, and triples counts in Table 4.20
and the values in Table 4.22. The known values are calculated using Equation 3.22. As

shown in Table 4.23, the calculated effective 238U mass agrees well with the known values.
This shows the technique works well when not in the presence of 232U
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Table 4.23: Calculated and known effective 238U masses from the uranium isotopic vectors
without 232U
m238 eff [g]
Calculated Known

Initial
3%
5%
20%

983
961
945
796

983
961
941
790

Percent
difference
0.00
0.00
0.43
0.76

Table 4.24 shows the calculated and known effective 238U masses (m238 eff) and 232U

masses (m232 eff) from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. The effective 232U masses

were calculated using Equation 3.26 and the effective 238U masses were calculated using

Equation 3.25 with the singles, doubles, and triples counts in Table 4.19 and the values in
Table 4.21. The known effective 232U masses were found using Equation 3.24 and the

known effective 238U masses were found using Equation 3.22. The calculated and known
values disagree considerably.

Table 4.24: Calculated and known effective 238U and 232U masses from the uranium isotopic
vectors with 232U
m232 eff [g]
Initial
3%
5%
20%

Calculated Known
26
195
239
337

13
14
15
23

Percent
difference
100
1,293
1,493
1,365

m238 eff [g]
Calculated Known
11,131
67,864
122,491
689,192

1,005
1,095
1,172
1,761

Percent
difference
1,007
6,097
10,351
39,036

In order to attempt to correct the disagreement between the calculate and known

values, rather than use the leakage multiplication found via Equation 3.28, the net

multiplication (Mnet) from the MCNP6 simulations is used instead. This net multiplication is
a weighted average of the net multiplications found via the (α,n) and spontaneous fission
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MCNP6 simulations. Table 4.25 shows the calculated and known effective 238U masses (m238
eff)

and 232U masses (m232 eff). Although this percent difference is less using Mnet, the

disagreement is still too significant to accurately and effectively quantify the uranium mass.
Table 4.25: Calculated and known effective 238U and 232U masses from the uranium isotopic
vectors with 232U using Mnet
m232 eff [g]
Percent
Calculated Known
difference
Initial
16
13
23.08
3%
45
14
221.43
5%
76
15
406.67
20%
567
23
2,365.22

m238 eff [g]
Calculated Known
1,685
4,798
7,977
55,525

1,005
1,095
1,172
1,761

Percent
difference
67.66
338.17
580.63
3,053.04

The major difference between the neutron emissions of the uranium isotopic

vectors with 232U and without 232U is the significant difference in their (α,n) emission rates.

Table 4.26 shows the (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of the uranium
isotopic vectors with 232U. Table 4.27 shows the (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron

emission rates of the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U. As shown in the tables below,

the α decay of 232U in the UO2 produces significantly more (α,n) neutrons than those found
in the uranium isotopic vectors without 232U.

Table 4.26: (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of uranium isotopic vectors
with 232U [n/s]
Spontaneous
Fission
4,365
14
26,785
16
46,274
17
193,633
28
(α,n)

Initial
3%
5%
20%
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Total
4,379
26,801
46,291
193,661

Table 4.27: (α,n) and spontaneous fission neutron emission rates of uranium isotopic vectors
without 232U [n/s]
(α,n)
Initial
3%
5%
20%

232U

0
1
1
6

Spontaneous
Fission
14
13
13
11

Total
14
14
14
17

The significantly larger (α,n) source strength in the uranium isotopic vectors with

cause a notable increase in the sensitivity of the relationship between the effective

masses and the leakage multiplication. Figure 4.50 shows the effective 238U mass (m238 eff)
as a function of the leakage multiplication (ML). Slight variations in the leakage

multiplication will produce only slight variations in the effective 238U mass. For example, a

1% difference in the leakage multiplication will produce only a difference of approximately
10 grams in the effective 238U masses.
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Figure 4.50: Effective 238U mass vs. leakage multiplication from uranium isotopic vectors
without 232U
Figure 4.51 shows the effective 232U mass (m232 eff) as a function of the leakage

multiplication (ML) from the uranium isotopic vectors with 232U. Unlike the relationship
shown in Figure 4.50, the relationship between the effective 232U mass and the leakage
multiplication is significantly sensitive. Slight variations in the leakage multiplication

produces significantly different 232U mass values (on the order of 100s to 1000s of grams).
This impact increases with higher concentrations of 232U. Minor errors in the nuclear data

used will produce significantly erroneous effective 232U masses. The limited nuclear data of
232U

produces significant issues with the use of this technique to quantify uranium mass. In

order to effectively calculate the uranium mass via passive neutron interrogation in the

presence of 232U, further investigation must be done to produce accurate nuclear data for
232U

in real world measurements.

123

1000
900
800

m232 eff [g]

700
600

Initial

500

3%

400

5%

300

20%

200
100
0
1.010

1.015

1.020
ML

1.025

1.030

Figure 4.51: Effective 232U mass vs. leakage multiplication from uranium isotopic vectors with
232U
In addition to the passive neutron interrogation discussed here, an active analysis is

also done. The AWCC is utilized in its active configuration in MCNP6 to produce active

doubles count rates from the uranium isotopic vectors with and without 232U. Figure 4.52
shows the active doubles count rates graphed as a function of the 235U mass from the

uranium isotopic vectors with and without 232U. The relationship between the active

doubles count rate and the 235U mass are similar both with and without 232U. There is a
slight contribution in the active doubles count rate from the 232U mass. If the passive
doubles count rate can be removed from the active measurement, then this active
interrogation could possibly be used to quantify the 235U mass.
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Figure 4.52: Active doubles count rate vs. 235U mass
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

5.1. Plutonium Conclusions
238Pu

The analyses in this study illustrate the value of increasing the concentration of

in used fuel for reducing the material attractiveness. However, the magnitude of this

decrease in material attractiveness is not significant enough to warrant the label of

“proliferation proof” or even unattractive for weapons purposes. Although the model based
analysis was promising, the Figure of Merit analysis showed the difficulty in reaching the
unattractive limit via increased 238Pu concentrations.

The model based approach concluded the concentration of 238Pu in the plutonium

isotopic vector shown in Table 3.1 was high enough to render the HNED models described

in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 useless. In the time dependent analysis of the more realistic

model (Table 3.4), the self-explosion temperature in the high explosives was reached after

approximately 7.5 hours from the initial insertion of the weapons pit into the model.

However, external cooling with liquid nitrogen prevented the self-explosion temperature

from being reached. The tensile strength in the high explosives and beryllium was reached
in all four scenarios, likely producing plastic deformation. The possibility of the weapon
being rendered totally useless or a significant reduction in the yield represent major
obstacles to proliferation. These results show the impractically and difficulty in
weaponizing this plutonium vector for these simple implosion models.

The application of the Figure of Merit equations shown in Equation 2.1 and Equation

2 to the plutonium vector yielded significantly fewer positive results regarding its material
attractiveness. In comparison to the additional plutonium vectors from Table 3.5, the

material attractiveness was lower. However, all three fell within the same range for both
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FOM equations. For less technically advanced states, all three plutonium vectors are

unattractive according to FOM1 (Equation 2.1). For technically advanced states, all three

plutonium vectors are attractive according to FOM2 (Equation 2.2). This conclusion is to be
expected as the heat generation factor in FOM equations is normalized to 80% 238Pu and

the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate is normalized to reactor grade. Thus, any
plutonium isotopic vector from used reactor fuel with less than 80% 238Pu will be

unattractive for less technically advanced states and attractive for technically advanced

states. Currently, surpassing these limits in used fuel is in most cases impractical or even

unattainable given current reactor designs. Therefor as long as the Figure of Merit

approach discussed here in its present form is used to analyze plutonium vectors from
used fuel, these conclusions will be the same.
5.2. Uranium Conclusions

This study successfully illustrated the reduction of material attractiveness in

uranium materials via the introduction of 232U and the build-up of its daughter products.

Unlike the case of the plutonium analysis, this reduction of material attractiveness proved

successful in both the model based and Figure of Merit analyses. However, the introduction
of 232U poses additional obstacles to its implementation in a civilian nuclear fuel cycle.

The model based analysis showed the concentration of 232U in the weapons grade

uranium vector (90%) from Table 3.6 in the model shown in Table 3.8 sufficient to reduce
the material attractiveness. As shown in Figure 4.14 through Figure 4.20, the temperature
in the high explosives exceeds its self-explosion temperature rendering the weapon

useless. In addition, the high explosives begin to degrade after 2.1 years as a result of
radiation dose. The transient heat transfer analysis showed that the self-explosion
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temperature within the high explosives is reached after approximately 1 day, unless the
model is continuously externally cooled by liquid nitrogen. Similarly, to the plutonium

model based results, the strength of the high explosives and beryllium is surpassed in all
four scenarios. This will likely produce plastic deformation in those materials and a

possible reduction in the yield. The model based analysis illustrates the impracticality of
utilizing this uranium material in simple implosion type fission weapons.

The Figure of Merit results also show a significant decrease in material

attractiveness. Considering the spontaneous fission neutron generation rate of the

weapons grade uranium vector is relatively low, the FOM equations for less technically

advanced states (Equation 2.1) and for technically advanced states (Equation 2.2) yield the
same results. Thus, these conclusions are valid for both less technically advanced and
technically advanced states. As shown in Figure 4.34, the build-up of 232U’s daughter

products causes the material to become unattractive for weapons purposes within the first
6 to 9 months after separation. In order to maintain the weapons usability of the material,
the daughter products must be removed approximately semi-annually. This poses a
significant burden on the proliferating state and would be impractical.

Although the merits of utilizing 232U to decrease material attractiveness are clear,

implementing 232U in civilian nuclear fuel cycles would be difficult. At the 232U

concentrations shown in Table 3.6, the dose rate from the pellet (Figure 3.1), rod (Figure

3.2), and can (Figure 3.3) pose a significant safety risk. The 5 rem annual limit imposed by
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be reached far too quickly and thus

significant shielding would be required. In addition, both gamma ray and neutron nondestructive assay techniques proved ineffective in the presence of 232U. Although,
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quantifying 235U mass via active neutron interrogation may be possible. Considering both

the safety and safeguards concerns, the decrease in material attractiveness is currently not
sufficient to justify the implementation of 232U at these concentrations in a civilian nuclear
fuel cycle. The burden of increasing shielding throughout the handling of the material as
well as the need for new non-destructive assay safeguards techniques would likely
outweigh the obstacles to proliferation from most state’s perspectives.

One of the most beneficial conclusions of this study is the increase in detectability

with the addition of 232U. Although the security neutron analysis showed no increase in

detectability, the security gamma ray analysis showed a significant increase in

detectability. When comparing gamma ray measurements of the 90% vector with 232U
(Table 3.6) and that without 232U (Table 3.7), the spectra with 232U are clearly

distinguishable between background and the spectra without 232U, in particularly at the 6
month and 10 year time intervals. The intensity of the spectra with 232U indicates the

possibility of producing an increase in detectability even at a lower concentration of 232U.

Although the concentrations of 232U discussed here are likely too high to implement within
a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, the possibility of implementing lower concentrations of 232U

exists. This possibility could come to fruition if the safety and safeguards impacts of 232U

are minimized while its impact on gamma ray detectability is further evaluated. Combing

computational and experimental efforts to explore gamma ray measurements of uranium

materials with significantly lower concentrations of 232U than those discussed here would

be useful to determine the minimum amount of 232U that would produce a notable increase
in detectability.

129

5.3. Conclusions on the Effectiveness of Material Attractiveness Analyses

This study utilized two different techniques to evaluate material attractiveness that

represent both a specific evaluation and a more broad evaluation. The model based

analysis is likely the most restrictive analysis in terms of overall material attractiveness

conclusions. Although it is impossible to evaluate the material attractiveness for specific

HNED models, a comprehensive determination must involve all the possible permutations
of nuclear weapons designs. Currently this is not possible, because the vast majority of
these possible designs fall within the classified space. The Figure of Merit analysis

discussed in this study allows for a more comprehensives evaluation while still relying on
open source information for the analysis. However, these techniques are just two of the
many possible techniques utilized to quantify material attractiveness or proliferation
resistance.

As mentioned in this study, the most significant shortcoming of the FOM equations

shown in Equation 2.1 and Equation 2.2 is its inability to account for processes such as

enrichment or reprocessing. In the uranium analysis, this study evaluated several isotopic
vectors at various 235U concentrations originating from the same initial uranium isotopic

vector. Due to limits of the FOM equations, the material attractiveness of only the weapons

grade (90%) isotopic vector could be considered. Therefor the entire enrichment process is
neglected in the final determination of this material attractiveness. Ideally, the material
attractiveness of the specific material initially possessed by the state would be useful
rather than the material attractiveness of the weaponized version of this material.

Similarly, the plutonium analysis only considers the plutonium isotopic vector in its final
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metallic state rather than present in the used fuel. This doesn’t account for the processing
required to remove plutonium from the used fuel.

A public workshop preformed at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy

known as the “Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles” discussed several aspects of

proliferation risk assessments (64). This workshop not only discussed the Figure of Merit
analysis used here, but also more comprehensive methods of evaluating proliferation
resistance. These more comprehensive methods not only consider the material

attractiveness, but also many factors that contribute to proliferation risk such as
characteristics of the entire fuel cycle or the proliferant state. Perhaps the most

comprehensive of these methods is the Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation

Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR) that was developed at Texas A&M (65). PRAETOR uses
what is known as a multi attribute utility analysis methodology to consider many possible
attributes to the proliferation of nuclear material to quantify the associated proliferation
risk (66). Although useful, this method is most useful in analyzing a larger aspect of a
nuclear fuel cycle rather than a specific material.

Another specific illustration of the shortcomings of the Figure of Merit analysis can

also be found in the literature. A group at LLNL applied the figure of merit equation to a
specific material but made additional considerations (66). Although the figure of merit
conclusions showed the material was attractive, the group recognized the following

attributes were not evaluated in the FOM analysis: the difficulty of stealing, diverting, or
transporting the material and the number of significant quantities available. The group

concluded that combining the figure of merit with these additional considerations proves
useful although they concede that it may be “impossible to come up with absolute
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quantitative measures of proliferation resistance.” This final conclusion serves as the main
justification for only utilizing the FOM equations to quantify the material attractiveness.
If the techniques described in this study (utilizing 238Pu and 232U for decreasing

material attractiveness) were to be expanded, the use of a tool such as PRAETOR would be
useful. In the case of the plutonium material, the final conclusions would not likely change,

because the current obstacles of reprocessing and handling of similar plutonium materials
are not considered significant to justify a reduction in safeguards. However, in the case of
uranium, the final conclusions may possibly differ. The decay of 232U poses significant

handling and reprocessing issues. If the safety and safeguards issues shown here were
overcame and 232U were implemented into a civilian nuclear fuel cycle, applying a
PRAETOR would be necessary as a compliment to the FOM analysis. Analysis this
hypothetical fuel cycle that included 232U might shed additional light on 232U’s

comprehensive effect at reducing the proliferation risk. However, this is outside of the

scope of this study and would require additional considerations to limit the burden of 232U
on the state seeking to use the material for peaceful purposes.
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